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Abstract
There is a current gap in the literature regarding uniform and consistent standards and
policies for addressing criminal hacking at the international level. The purpose of this
quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship between individuals in the public
and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need for international law defining
criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the act. Since the advent of
information and communication technologies, there has been a need to address security
holistically. The security and sustainability of evolving technologies are examined in
light of the threat landscape of criminal hacking, privacy concerns, and policies and laws.
Role theory in connection with empathy served as the theoretical base for the research.
Data were collected through an anonymous survey of 228 respondents from cybersecurity
related organizations from public and private employment sectors. The data analyses
resulted in no significance among the groups of employment sectors and the independent
and dependent variables, although there were statistically significant results between age
groups, gender, infrastructure affiliation, and hacking ability among the questions of the
study. Proactively addressing and securing global societies from criminal hacking is
paramount in helping to alleviate escalating economic and personal losses among
organizations and individuals worldwide. The research insights can be used for positive
social change in drafting and implementing cyber policies and laws for criminal hacking
among local, state, national, and international bodies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Today’s virtual landscape has consistently evolved with the advent of newer and
emerging technologies. There is a need for legislative bodies, law enforcement agencies,
and public and private sector organizations to make significant strides in collaboratively
addressing security issues that have escalated from the exponential technological growth
over the past several decades. Ghernaouti (2013) illustrated the vastness of information
and communication technologies (ICT) and the power they enable. This power is
achieved on both sides of the legal spectrum, while the ultimate power can be described
as the ability to harness the digital technological infrastructure realm for responding to
various machinations (Ghernaouti, 2013). Dixon (2007) showed there is more to
addressing security issues in the information technology realm, which surpassed the use
of technologies to secure the environment and encompassing a comprehensive approach
to education and policy.
The cyber world has no boundaries and the interconnectivity of technologies has
posed many threats. Multinational efforts, including the United Nations, the Group of
Eight, International Telecommunications Union, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, have addressed cybersecurity and critical infrastructure
protection toward a global standard approach, which will take time (Segura Serrano,
2015). More specifically, there is a need for consistent multinational collaboration in the
policy realm for clearly defining criminal hacking and the punishments for committing
these crimes.
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Oh and Lee (2014) explained the need for specificity in the realm of criminal law
for penalizing acts of criminal hacking. Oh and Lee (2014) found that the degree to which
hacking crimes are penalized should be closely evaluated, due to the variations of the
crime and the damages caused, to help in determining appropriate punishments. In their
study, Oh and Lee (2014) evaluated the attitudes of respondents in the public and private
sectors through anonymous individual surveys, focusing on the development of a
consistent international standard that would serve as the rule for global societies in
defining and prosecuting acts of criminal hacking to glean insight or new knowledge that
could be used for future studies.
The world has changed and evolved in the way global societies function on a
daily basis, including the usage of many technological devices that create vulnerabilities
and risks for the user. Buchanan (2016) showed how the “cybersecurity dilemma,”
which encompassed defensive and offensive intrusions among nations and the
sometimes-unintended consequences that resulted in these acts. This illustrated only a
piece of the holistic picture that represented technological intrusions and potential
ramifications involved in the virtual realm.
All users of virtual technologies need to be aware of the vulnerabilities of the
technologies and how risks, involving the security of individuals, properties,
organizations, and nations come into play. Cavelty, Mauer, and Krishna-Hensel (2007)
explored documentation from the World Summit on the Information Society from
December 12, 2003, which stated the action plan of coordinative efforts among the public
and private sectors to address cybercrime issues and legislative implementation, while
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promoting initiatives for educating the population toward being aware of the threat
landscape and building a security culture. This chapter provides a synopsis of the
background of the connecting elements of the study, which included the threat landscape
of criminal hacking, security issues involving virtually connected devices, privacy issues
in relation to criminal hacking, and the challenges of global coordinative legislative
efforts for creating and implementing legislation for the punishment of criminal hacking.
Additional sections for the chapter provide a comprehensive foundation for the study.
In the realm of cybersecurity and policy, there is a need to explore individual
public and private sector attitudes toward having an international law that defines
criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the crime, so legislative efforts can
better address the problem of criminal hacking in the cyber realm. McDonald (2002)
explained how risks and uncertainty have substantially increased on the global scene due
to all processes involved in globalization. Although many insights have been studied,
McDonald (2002) concluded that a successful policy approach toward a democratic
governance response will entail considerations that include proactively engaging
interactions among the public administrators, while understanding our fallibilities. This
study provides a framework that connects the threat landscape of criminal hacking with
the security of global networks and connected technologies, and the security and privacy
of all who rely on connected technologies in the modern-day era to help promote uniform
policy solutions for the punishments of criminal hacking.
The theoretical foundation for the study is role theory, in tandem with an
illustration of critical policy issues, which was used to examine the urgency and
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obligations of future generations and the well-being of global society. The research
questions in this study were used to examine attitudes toward the need for establishing an
international law for a global definition of criminal hacking, attitudes in establishing an
international law for regulating punishments for criminal hacking activities, and attitudes
toward the extent criminal hacking should be penalized. Definitions for the study,
assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and the significance of the study can be
seen from the brief synopsis provided on the criminal hacking threat landscape. A
holistic overview of the connecting entities that comprise interdisciplinary and
multidisciplinary domains was used to address the problem of the study in Chapter 1,
which provides a foundation for a detailed examination of the connected pieces in
Chapter 2.
Background
The background briefly summarized literature in relation to the study of criminal
hacking and policy efforts toward creating and implementing legislation and for the
crime, the threat landscape of cybercriminal hacking activities in relation to privacy and
security, and why there is a need to study multinational standards for the punishments of
criminal hacking. The scope of the study fell under the umbrella of cybercrime, which
embodies many categories and methodologies. The study specifically addressed the
crimes of hacking and the penalties associated with the crime, while the attitudes
implementing effective policies and laws on an international level were examined.
When developing policies and laws, there is a need to holistically understand the
elements intertwined within the problems being addressed. To better understand the
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evolution of hacking, the following is an introduction to what has become a multibilliondollar criminal activity worldwide (Internet Security Threat Report, 2017). A glimpse of
the speed at which the technological landscape has matured and morphed is illustrated,
and vital elements lay a critical foundation for the study.
Examples of cybercrime can be seen as far back as 100 years ago, described Hill
and Marion (2016), with a cyber-hacking incident involving Morse code. Nevil
Maskelyne, an inventor and magician, born over 150 years ago, hacked a demonstration
of the emerging technology of Morse code at London’s Royal Institution Theater in 1903
without the knowledge of the demonstrators, John Ambrose Fleming and his friend
Guglielmo Marconi (Hill & Marion, 2016). Maskelyne intercepted the Morse code
message and changed it to display something other than that intended, which showed the
audience the technology was vulnerable to security issues, including privacy (Hill &
Marion, 2016). The Morse code example shows how humans can figure out inventions
and manipulate them for various reasons and motivations.
The Internet of today is young in comparison with technological advancements
over the past century (Hill & Marion, 2016). Hill and Marion (2016) elaborated on the
evolution of the Internet, being initiated over 50 years ago, with the use of technologies
developed for the military and research purposes during the Cold War to prevent the
Soviet Union from continuing their technological lead after being the first to launch a
satellite into space. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and the
information processing techniques office had the ability to share information through
computer interconnectivity, which did not become fully used until the Advance Research
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Projects Agency Network (ARPANet) was created (Hill & Marion, 2016). These
technological advancements enabled the creation of the Internet in 1990 and created new
avenues for the criminal world to thrive (Hill & Marion, 2016).
Although computer crimes were minimal throughout the 1960s through the 1970s,
due to computer usage being primarily restricted to researchers and the military, hacking
activities took place, mainly by curious students who wanted to better understand the
technological environment showcasing their skills to be able to break into something
designed to be secure (Hill & Marion, 2016). Hacking offenders oftentimes would sign
virus intrusions with their names, due to their confidence and the lack of laws for the
criminalization of these types of activities (Hill & Marion, 2016).
Hacking activities and the criminalization of hacking has evolved since the 1960s
and 1970s due to the escalation of computer crimes and the implementation of policies
and laws in the cyber realm. Hill and Marion (2016) showed how during the 1970s the
motivations of hackers began changing from an inquisitive nature to more malicious and
damaging. Hill and Marion (2016) identified a computer crime in the 1970s, including
the manipulation of computer data at the Union Dime Savings Bank in 1973 for
embezzlement.
The 1970s gave rise to a hacking technique called phreaking, which involved the
technological skills of hackers to break into phone systems, using tones and the codes
from the system to gain access to free long-distance phone calls (Hill & Marion, 2016).
At the Flagler Dog Track in Florida, tickets were altered to produce winning numbers,
which led the Florida computer Crimes Act of 1978 to define accessing a computer
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without authorization as a crime (Hill & Marion, 2016). The Federal Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act was passed in October 1986. More details on this legislative act and how
criminal hacking has progressed over the last several decades will be in Chapter 2.
Criminal hacking has greatly contributed to data breaches and cybercrime, in
general, over the last couple of decades and continues to escalate. Hampson (2012)
provided information on how billions of dollars are lost each year due to criminal
hacking. The Internet Security Threat Report detailed how cybercrime is growing
exponentially every year and the loss from data breaches in 2017 consisted of more than
one billion personal records being compromised, and this is only what has been reported,
as companies often choose not to report the entirety of their breach (Symantec, 2018).
Symantec’s (2017) study also indicated that approximately seven billion identities have
been stolen over the past 8 years, approximately the number of the global population
today.
Nash and Thomas (2006) explained that approximately three fourths of the
experts in the security realm of IT believe that cyber criminals are prevailing due to a
lack of international laws, law enforcement resources, and lack of overall global
participation and cooperation in addressing the importance of hacking crime. Pollaro
(2010) provided information on how the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has
been revised to broaden its scope as a statute from the U.S. Federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, that once primarily addressed hacking of government computers but now
addresses hacking of any computer connected to the Internet. Kain (2013) argued that the
Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has resulted in a patchwork system that is not
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uniform. Concerted efforts among international stakeholders are needed to help address
inconsistencies surrounding criminal hacking policies and deterrence.
Goodman (2015) explained how societies depend on the technological
interconnectivities that enhance quality of life, whether through convenience or
efficiency, but with these continuously advancing technologies comes many
vulnerabilities. The growth of technologies coincides with Moore’s law and the effects
that come with the use (Goodman, 2015). Moore’s law will be examined in Chapter 2.
There is a dark world of hidden criminal activities within the universe of borderless
virtual boundaries and all the intricacies involved (Goodman, 2015). Holistically
understanding what is happening in the virtual world, through the help of international
technical experts, could help in determining what the best course of action would be for
future policies addressing cyber-criminal activity.
The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (2017) interviewed Lynn St. Amour, chair
of the Internet Governance Forum, which advises the secretary general on the Internet
Governance Forum meetings. The Internet Governance Forum, founded in 2005, now
has approximately 55 interdisciplinary worldwide organization members, including
public and private sectors, academia, technical organizations, and civic society, who
collectively deal with Internet governance issues on the global scene. St. Amour
responded to a question about what the future holds for the Internet over the next decade
by explaining how the growing Internet of Things (IoT) and technologies using
blockchain will have an even greater impact on society than the present focus of the
financial markets. St. Amour expounded on how 50% of the world that is not connected
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to the Internet now will increase, moving toward a technologically mobile device
concentration that is multifaceted, making up the future of the Internet (Global Forum on
Cyber Expertise, 2017). This growth will add to the complexities involving technological
security and the policies crafted in addressing the acts of criminal hacking.
Burkart and McCourt (2017) identified the security and privacy concerns with
packaged software being developed and distributed in markets that have minimal
regulation in the technological realm for the purposes of online surveillance. The
European Union addressed, through policy, the protection of personally identifiable
information in the form of a framework, which regulates marketing of personally
identifiable information (PII; Burkart & McCourt, 2017). This type of framework has not
been implemented in the United States, although these issues may be addressed through
self-regulation in industry, which could help in the implementation of international
treaties addressing trade in these markets for curtailing various security and privacy
concerns, stated Burkart and McCourt (2017).
Roberts (2013) argued that leaders will need to recruit and teach strategic cyber
thinkers, so there can be proactive efforts in gathering international support to catch and
prosecute criminal hacking activities. Theohary and Rollins (2009) illustrated how many
issues have challenged the United States, including not knowing for sure where the
perpetrators committing various cyber-attacks are located. A lack of federal-private
sector coordinative efforts in determining potential risks and new increasing threats at the
international level poses the continued possibilities of national critical infrastructure
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disruptions, which suggests the need for enhanced strategies and updated policies
(Theohary & Rollins, 2009).
Brown and Poellet (2012) showed how customary international law vastly differs
from the case law system, making proposals for universal legislation extremely
challenging. Trivun, Mahmutćehajić, and Silajdžić (2012) warned that the only way the
Internet architecture can be properly maintained and secured in this global environment is
total collective participant in regulation development and implementation. The results of
this study can help in coordinating efforts toward the creation and implementation of
effective policies for criminal hacking, while providing relevant research of the current
threat landscape of criminal hacking.
Problem Statement
The overall receptiveness and acceptance of technological advances over the past
several decades, from the Internet to the numerous applications used to make everyday
lives easier, have created a global dilemma. By readily accepting, and in many cases,
embracing, these technologies without fully understanding the security risks and
implications involved, a global threat landscape has developed in the virtual realm, which
lacks consistent regulations and controls. The lack of consistent regulations and controls
throughout various global jurisdictions has contributed to the difficulties in finding the
true origins of computer intrusions and bringing to justice those responsible under a
criminal justice system that deals with the problem consistently at all levels of
government.
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The global community is arguably past due in having consistent established
policies and legislation that specifically address the penalties and punishments of hacking
activities in the information technology realm. Greengard (2012) suggested that nation
states more lenient in their legislative practices toward the criminal behaviors of hacking
may be opening up, if not already providing, a haven for hackers. Nash and Thomas
(2006) explained that the growing problem of hacking continues to be detrimental to
societies worldwide, and legislative actions among various nation states have not been
able to fully address the problem. Hampson (2012) showed that various acts of hacking
are responsible for crippling world economies, with losses of billions of dollars every
year.
There is a current gap in the literature regarding uniform and consistent standards
and policies for addressing criminal hacking at the international level. No clear definition
for criminal hacking or agreement on punishment for the crime pose a number of
challenges, negatively affecting the sustainability of evolving technologies. In this
quantitative study, I explored individual public and private sector attitudes toward the
need for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated
with the act and the extent to which the crime should be penalized.
Purpose of the Study
Criminal hacking has been taking place for decades. Billions of dollars have been
lost due to criminal hacking and the costs continue to escalate. Security breaches are
only one aspect of the problem. The Symantec 2016 Internet Security Threat Report
stated there were 1,209 breaches in 2016, up approximately 25% since 2013 (Symantec,
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2017). The report also stated an average of 927,000 identities were exposed per breach.
A security breach involves many elements that harm individuals, businesses, and the
global economy. There are multifaceted criminal uses for the information obtained
through these breaches. The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the
relationship between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes
toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties
associated with the act.
The criminal world has created an opportunity of cyberspace to accomplish
exponential gains. Mitchell (2016) stated that hacking attempts worldwide surpassed one
billion in 2012 according to a study by the British security firm NCC Group. The
complexity of curtailing crimes taking place in a virtual environment without an
established system for controlling those criminal activities continues to grow.
Effectively securing networks and technological devices is essential. Buchanan
(2016) delineated how the international arena is comprised of computer hacking for
intelligence gathering through the intrusion of various networks in the public and private
sectors. These intrusions can be avenues for attacks capable of manipulating and
destroying data (Buchanan, 2016). Buchanan further stated that, through digital forensic
reporting, it is evident there are intrusions being employed on the national scene for more
than defensive and training purposes, although not all nation states have the capabilities
for this. The sense of urgency among international communities has not been compelling
enough to reach international solutions to curtail criminal activities in cyberspace (Fidler,
2016).
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Through scholarly research, an examination of the threat landscape, privacy and
security, and multinational policies and laws provided a foundation for the focus of this
study. The relationship among public and private sector individuals and their attitudes
toward one international law for defining criminal hacking and subsequent punishments
were explored, which provided insights that could help propel global policy awareness
toward addressing the virtual threat landscape of criminal hacking. Additionally, the
insights gained determined the need for an enhanced approach to address policy and law
for criminal hacking through increased coordinated efforts with multinational and
international laws regulating the criminal hacking realm. In this quantitative study, I
used an anonymous survey to examine attitudes among public and private sector
individuals on the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the
degree of penalties for committing the crime. Statistical tests of the data revealed a
correlation among some of the variables of the study, which provided some statistical
significance among the attitudes of the respondents.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The research questions for this quantitative dissertation were designed to gain
some insight from public and private sector individuals on their attitudes toward the need
for an international law defining criminal hacking, the penalties associated with the act,
and the extent to which it should be punished. The independent variables of the study
included age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking
ability, and education, which related to the hypotheses by providing, through correlation,
what the relationship was among the groups of public and private sector entities for the
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variables of the study. The central research question is: Is there a need for the definition
of criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the act to be addressed under one
international law?
RQ1: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for one international
law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector entities?
H01: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for one
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector
individuals?
H11: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for one
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector
individuals?
RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for the penalties of
criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between public and private
sector individuals?
H02: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for the
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between
public and private sector individuals?
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H12: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for the
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between
public and private sector individuals?
RQ3: Is there a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the
extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs modification of
stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector individuals?
H03: There is no difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector
individuals?
H13: There is a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector
individuals?
Theoretical Foundation
The threat landscape of criminal hacking played a significant role in the security
of networks and technologically connected devices and the security of individuals and
their privacy. The threat landscape, in relation to the holistic security of individuals and
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all connected technologies, provided a foundation for the need to develop and implement
universal standards for the punishments of criminal hacking using the frameworks of role
theory and empathy in political theory.
Trivun et al. (2012) pointed out that regulation encompassing the architecture of
the Internet cannot be determined by individual entities, but rather it must involve
authorities at all levels, relying on economic and political entities at the local, national,
and international level. Trivun et al. (2012) showed how the Internet acts as an
international framework that could unite various regions of the world to work together in
harmony, while addressing various security issues present. This framework, according to
Trivum et al. (2012), is comprised of entities at the lowest levels in government and those
at the highest levels and cannot be separated from traditional laws and theories of law
that have governed communities before the advent of the Internet.
Menon and Siew (2012) showed how a unified multilateral effort is needed to
address cybersecurity issues, which play a significant role in the future and security of the
global economy. Newman and Thakur (2006) illustrated how global societies are
vulnerable to many of the same problems that each entity faces separately in relation to a
number of global issues. There is more efficiency in multiple coordinative efforts for the
common good of the world rather than unilateral or stand-alone efforts, even with the
limitations that come with the holistic approach (Newman & Thakur, 2006). A closer
look at these efforts offers insight into where policy initiatives are underway in
addressing criminal hacking. Furthermore, foreign policy in the context of international
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relations provides an aggregate illustration in relation to these different political cultures
in Chapter 2.
Role theory, as demonstrated by Thies (2009), served as an umbrella theoretical
framework for this study in the context of international governing entities. Given that the
nation-state system is understood through the lens of international relations, role theory
helped contextualize how hacking has been approached at the international level. This
theory, projected through an exploratory lens, helped explain the role of foreign policy
and its connections to public administrators (Below, 2014). The use of role theory in this
study provided a model for positive social change toward international coordination
efforts in addressing policy issues surrounding criminal hacking for clearly defining the
act of criminal hacking and the punishment standards for the act.
An examination of empathy in political theory, as posited by Edge (2016),
showed how empathy is a key component missing in the political landscape today, and it
may offer some hope in addressing future international initiatives. The phenomena that
provided a foundation for the study encompassed pieces of a conceptual puzzle, which
included the security of everything technologically connected and the privacy and
security of everybody in the virtual realm and policies and laws in relation to the
cybercriminal threat landscape of criminal hacking. From these concepts, relative
proposition statements showed how the puzzle pieces, figuratively speaking, are
connected and related through the theoretical veins of role theory and empathy in
political theory. These theories, as separately illustrated in the literature, are examined in
Chapter 2.
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In this study, I explored criminal hacking through a framework that used the
current threat landscape in the virtual realm as a magnifier for determining if there is a
need for an international law defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with
the act. Logical connections for this study have been illustrated through the threat
landscape of criminal hacking, which includes categories and methodologies. Security
and privacy issues have been connected in relation to criminal hacking, furnishing
evidence that addresses the deficiencies of multinational policies and laws for the
punishments of criminal hacking. This framework provided significance to the problem
at hand while offering key concepts that work in conjunction with the theories used,
which supply insight for the questions of the study. The connections are analyzed and
covered in Chapter 2.
Nature of the Study
A quantitative approach was used for the study. Qualitative studies can be more
complex in the interpretive arena and rely on statistical analysis and testing methods. In
this research, I took a pragmatic approach, using breadth to add to the validity and
strength of the study. The scope of the study incorporated quantitative methods for
empirically focusing on descriptive statistics to evaluate audience segmentation and
opinions for the hypotheses tested in attempts to garner information universally. The
study combined empirical and theoretical aspects, which provided a comprehensive
picture of the phenomena, while the questions of the study established predictions and
material for future studies that choose to use quantitative and qualitative methods.
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It is important to understand basic meanings of the foundational verbiage used
throughout this dissertation. A few explanations involving the threat landscape, criminal
hacking, and personally identifiable information are given to clarify these concepts and
phrases, for the purpose of this study. The following provides definitions for these key
terms.
Definitions
Threat landscape: For the purpose of this study, the concept of the threat
landscape refers to the acts of criminal hacking and the methodologies used.
Criminal hacking: Unlawful hacking, according to the laws put in place in any
particular jurisdiction.
Personally identifiable information (PII): Any type of information that identifies
or can help to identify an individual. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Privacy Office (2002) distinguishes between PII and sensitive PII. The European Union
differentiates PII data as being personal data or sensitive data (General Data Protection
Regulation, Art. 4).
Assumptions
The quantitative paradigm assumptions include questions that should be answered
ontologically, epistemologically, axiologically, rhetorically, and methodologically
(Creswell, 1994). The ontological assumption addresses the question of reality, which is
objectively examined. The epistemological assumption provides a distinction that a
researcher will be independent from the research. The axiological, or role, assumption
shows that the research is unbiased and free of values. The language of the research, or
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the rhetorical assumption, shows a formal and quantitatively impersonal stance. The
methodological assumption includes the research encompassed a deductive process
through generalizations, validity, and reliability.
The following assumptions are noted for the study: First, most technologies are
vulnerable to criminal hacking. Second, a security awareness culture will help alleviate
some of the vulnerabilities encountered from criminal hacking activities through the
implementation of best practice standard protocols in securing technologies. These
assumptions were necessary and provided the reader with general assumptions
recognized by many cybersecurity professionals and interdisciplinary and
multidisciplinary practitioners.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of the study is limited to the defined acts of criminal hacking and the
laws for the penalties associated with the crime. Cybercrime encompasses a vast array of
elements that would fall outside of the realm of criminal hacking, including cyber
bullying, child solicitation, identity theft, and cyberstalking; elements of criminal hacking
do come into play with all these crimes. Wilsem (2013) illustrated, how crimes that are
computer-focused, “…such as virus, malware or botnet infection, and hacking (as cited
from Furnell, 2002, p. 22),” solely depend on the technological realm, whereas computerassisted crimes consist of crimes that took place before the inception of the Internet but
use technologies to commit crimes today. In this research study, I focused on the acts of
criminal hacking, the methodologies used, targets of the crime, and legislative efforts and
implementations for the punishments of criminal hacking.
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The populations for the study included interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary
individuals involved with the technological arena of cybersecurity in the public or private
sectors, cyber legislation realm, law enforcement, or academia. This study excluded the
general population due to scope and limitations; future studies could gain a broader
insight by conducting a study of the general population from a multinational population.
I chose this focus because societies are past due in clearly defining and addressing the
penalties for the criminal acts of hacking in the virtual realm. Insights gained from this
study may help propel future studies in the policy realm by generating additional
knowledge to better understand attitudes among the public and private sector on the need
for international laws for criminal hacking.
In regard to generalizability, Barnes et al. (2012) showed how predictions for the
findings of a quantitative study cannot serve as being precise due to the sample size, the
interpretations of the sample in relation to the understanding of the questions being asked
of the population, and the baseline of the predictability and assumptions to similar or past
occurrences in the field of study. Barnes et al. (2012) explained how researchers should
consider using a precise external measurement process that consists of three categories of
generalizability, which include treatment measurement and subjects to add to the
reliability of the study; however, doing so does not guarantee similar results will be
obtained if applied outside the study. Scope and variance are examined in a quantitative
study.
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Limitations
The motivations of all criminal hacking incidents cannot be clearly defined, which
makes it challenging to address the penalties needed for various acts of criminal hacking.
According to the definition of the laws in place in different areas of the world, it remains
unclear if all criminal hackers possess a mindset for committing a criminal activity. It is
also unknown what part culture plays in various areas of the world toward the mindset of
committing criminal hacking. This study is based on information available to the public,
which alleviates classified information in the global arena. Policy information is also
limited to nation states that are open with their policies. Criminal hacking activities and
those that have been compromised are limited to what has been reported.
Available scholarly research has been examined to help provide a model in
delineating some of the motivations behind criminal hacking to contribute to the elements
needed for formulating a consistent standard policy for the punishments of criminal
hacking globally. Global policy initiatives may benefit from research that expounds on
the consistencies and inconsistencies in punishments of criminal hacking on a
multinational level, offering some insight into issues surrounding the challenges and
intricacies of developing standard policies in the virtual realm. Some implications of the
study offered the opportunity for positive social change in the realm of policy and
legislation, which can be drawn from the possibility of future studies in building on and
adding to this study in the realm of conviction rates for criminal hacking and the
recidivism rates of criminal hacking.
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Significance of the Study
Global societies have been working on how to deal with the creation and
implementation of effective policies in relation to cybercriminal activities that have been
escalating for decades. By peering through the lens of the threat landscape of criminal
hacking, security, privacy, policies, and laws, the connected concepts have been
examined to provide an epistemological overview of the ontology of criminal hacking.
These taxonomies have shown how each provides connecting threads toward building
effective solutions for mitigating the problems associated with criminal hacking.
There is a critical need to address the issues of criminal hacking at all
governmental levels and at the international level, so that no individuals or groups have
immunity from prosecution and conviction for criminal hacking activities (Greengard,
2012). This study contributes to the body of knowledge needed to address the problem
through an examination on the attitudes of public and private sector individuals toward
the need for clearly defining criminal hacking and the extent punishments should be
associated with the acts.
Hacking activities have accelerated with the use of hardware and software
technologies and the intricacies of the Internet and its connected networks, and the global
costs escalate. Hathaway (2014) evaluated the implications for regulating various aspects
of the Internet, and many existing policy challenges are deep-rooted within the foreign
policy realm. This study’s positive social change implications include the identification
of optimal legislative strategies and best-case practices in enforcement that bring the
world closer to uniform policies for various kinds of criminal hacking. Consequently, the
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study serves as a guide to parallel legislation at the level of the nation state and may
eventually support international treaties that establish uniform standards and a global
regime to combat criminal hacking.
Implications for Positive Social Change
There is hope this study will motivate researchers to continue with similar studies
in addressing the issues surrounding the new era of technological growth and the
implications it has on global societies in efforts to help promote potential solutions in
combating criminal acts in the ICT realm. By understanding the threat landscape in the
virtual realm and the negative consequences of various hacking crimes, coordinative
efforts among public and private sector entities have provided additional insights for
legislative bodies worldwide to band together and move forward in clearly defining and
regulating the criminal acts of hacking.
Summary
In this study, I looked at how role theory plays an integral part in addressing the
fundamental problems of technological compromise, while providing a foundation for
analyzing the current threat landscape of criminal hacking, and determining if there is a
need for an international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated
with the crime. The quantitative empirical study approach consisted of descriptive and
inferential statistical research, offering elements of audience segmentation and the ability
to quantify the perceptions, attitudes, and opinions of the sampling units, while
generalizing the relationships between the independent and dependent variables of the
study, which were used to gain insight and propose questions for future studies in the
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political legislative realm. The security of global societies depends on swiftly addressing
the problems that encompass our technological realm. In Chapter 2, the connecting
elements of the criminal hacking threat landscape, the security of networks and connected
devices, privacy internationally, and the multinational efforts in creating and
implementing legislation for the punishments of criminal hacking are examined.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Modern societies are experiencing exponential technological growth and with that
comes uncertainty for the threat landscape of vulnerabilities and privacy and security
concerns. The purpose of this study was to provide insight on attitudes toward a holistic
approach in addressing the threat landscape of criminal hacking through international
laws clearly defining criminal hacking, policies associated with criminal hacking, and
penalties for the crime. Given the virtual landscape has no given boundaries, various
international entities have come together to propose solutions for addressing the problem,
but no general consensus has been reached on how to proceed forward in defining and
addressing acts of criminal hacking and determining whether a need exists for a global
standard for policies and penalties associated with the crimes.
In Chapter 2, the following topics are discussed: a literature search strategy, a
theoretical foundation for the study, a literature review tying in key variables and
elements of the study, and a concluding summary of the fundamental paradigm of the
policy dilemma. A strategic approach was taken to exhaustively search the literature to
gain a holistic international insight to address the questions of the study, and the gap in
the literature was examined for the problem of the study.
Literature Search Strategy
The Walden University databases were accessed using various search engines in
relation to the study, including Political Science Complete, Criminal Justice Database,
SAGE Journals (formerly SAGE Premier), LegalTrac, LexisNexis Academic, Military
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and Government Collection, Homeland Security Digital Library, Science Direct, and
Thoreau Multiple Database Search. Key search terms, with the utilization of various
search combinations, were regulation, law, policy, legislation, universal legislation,
hacking, computer intrusion, ethical hacking, computer crime, cybercrime, cyber security
and cybersecurity, role theory, deterrence theory, punishment, public policy,
international legislation, foreign policy, international relations and cybersecurity law.
I performed an initial search of the connecting elements of the study to ensure
foundational works within the scope of the study were available. Most of the research for
this study consisted of peer-reviewed journal articles, books, and conference proceedings
covering the last 5 years; some research is provided from earlier writings of subject
matter experts. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is known for
setting standards in the electronics and computer industries. IEEE provided documents
on conference proceedings in relation to the study.
Theoretical Foundation
With a global environment that is virtually connected, addressing policy solutions
in the virtual realm will need the perspectives from multiple stakeholders. Trivun et al.
(2012) pointed out that regulation in relation to the Internet and modern-day technologies
should be approached from a holistic stance, including all political entities from local,
national, and international levels, to be able to fully address the intricacies involved. This
multinational, multidisciplinary approach could unite various regions of the world to
work together while addressing the threat landscape of the virtual realm. A body of
international leaders and experts should establish a policy framework to see the benefits
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of addressing role theory in connection with the roles played in leadership. These leaders
should enact those roles with expedient action and empathy, serving as an influencing
stimulus for all entities to model in the virtual realm.
Role Theory and Empathy
Role theory provided a theoretical foundation for this study with the consideration
of empathy. Thies (2009) showed the need for international communities to take the role
of working together to address policies through international relations, while Edge (2016)
showed how empathy is missing in the political environment of policy development.
Within the role theory construct is an illustration of applying an empathetic model
approach for addressing policy standards for the international community in the realm of
criminal hacking (Edge, 2016). Empathy can furnish a missing piece in international
policy strategies by embracing a genuine concern for the welfare of all entities involved
in the policy development process.
Looking through the lens of empathy while fulfilling a political obligation to work
in concert with international bodies may propel a holistic consideration for examining the
reasons and motivations of criminal hacking and potential solutions for addressing the
problem other than potential incarceration as a deterrence method. A multidisciplinary
approach, including the involvement of subject matter experts in relation to the many
elements involved, for considering a holistic international framework that provides
consistency and resiliency as the standard for all environments encompassing the virtual
realm (Trivum et al., 2012). Efforts should include a holistic approach of addressing the
elements of the virtual threat landscape of criminal hacking, the security of
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technologically connected devices, global awareness strategies for further addressing the
privacy and security of our global citizens (Menon and Siew, 2012).
Bonner (2016) illustrated how the role of actions in role theory depends on the
actor, with expectations coming into play as to what actions should be taken.
Controversial outlooks of the past, according to Arendt’s evaluation of what the action
role has in role theory, showed how role theorists looked objectively, rather than taking
an ethical approach, to political circumstances of action, which can be seen from the
atrocious acts committed throughout the centuries by those with political power playing
no empathetic role to achieve their agenda (Bonner, 2016). Today role theory can be
seen as a theoretical approach to applying expected actions to the roles given in
leadership, where it is expected that those with decision-making powers will fulfill their
roles in efforts to protect the population (Wehner & Thies, 2014). In this study, role
theory will provide a model for positive social change toward international efforts in
addressing policy standards and laws for criminal hacking.
The link to empathy in role theory provided an approach for examining future
international policy and law development through multinational coordinative efforts in
relation to the attitudes of multidisciplinary entities. This study consisted of a holistic
approach in tying the pieces of the current threat landscape of criminal hacking with the
elements of privacy and security and the attitudes toward an international approach in
establishing international laws for clearly defining criminal hacking and the policies and
penalties associated with the crime. The holistic framework provided significance for
addressing the problem of inconsistent policies for criminal hacking, while the theoretical
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foundations of role theory and empathy serve as a foundation for the questions of the
study on whether a need exists for one international law defining criminal hacking and
the punishments associated with the act.
Moore’s Law
Moore’s law provides implications and relevance to the problem of this study by
addressing the speed at which technologies evolve. Goodman (2015) showed how
Moore’s law, which shows technological growth doubling every 2 years in relation to
computer processing chip components, has continued the predicted path over the years,
although DeBenedictis (2017) delineated, citing Moore (1965), how Moore’s original
1965 article is broad in scope and there are modern-day inconsistencies. Nonetheless,
Moore’s law should continue to be recognized as a positive factor for the computational
growth in the technological realm moving forward.
Over the past 50 years there has been an evolution, in relation to the technological
growth of semiconductors and computers, described DeBenedictis (2017), enabling for
our technologies to surpass the original concept of Moore’s law, to include newer
technological developments that fall outside of the original scope of Moore’s law, such as
with 3-D manufacturing and neuromorphic circuits, quantum qubits, and newer
computing memory techniques. Denning and Lewis (2017) stated how technology in
relation to components, speed, and technological modernizations are normally applied to
Moore’s law, although the only one aspect that truly is a part of the original concept of
Moore’s law is the component element. The evaluations of Moore’s law show that we
must continue moving forward in addressing the intricacies involved in our technological
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environments as to the eventual consequences that could befall the global environment,
given the magnitude of the scope provided, and the future evaluations of the morphism
and adaptation of technological environments, as depicted by DeBenedictis (2017).
Technologies are evolving in ways that are difficult to predict. Cusumano and
Yoffie (2016) explored elements for moving forward in addressing newer technologies,
in that Moore’s law was a foundational impetus for major companies, such as Intel,
Microsoft, and Apple, which provided a forecast that has held true over the years. What
will the future hold after Moore’s law, questioned Cusumano and Yoffie (2016), in
relation to our assumptions of hardware, software, and digital advancements? These
questions are fundamental and should be examined and answered using a
multidisciplinary approach, including a wide array of participation among public and
private sector subject matter experts and leaders (Cusumano & Yoffie, 2016).
Literature Review
We are entering an era of machine learning and virtual and augmented realities,
which provides even further implications for policy development in the realm of privacy
and security. Proactive international policy development, in the realm of virtual
technologies, and a continuous multidisciplinary approach for immediately addressing
security issues along the way will help provide some continuity for helping to protect our
global societies from the technological threat landscape that has proliferated, practically
unnoticed, over the past several decades. The following concepts, consisting of the threat
landscape of cybercrime in relation to criminal hacking, privacy and security issues in
relation to criminal hacking, and policy and laws for the punishments of criminal hacking
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have been examined with an overview of the hacking environment. All the elements of
the study connect in various ways, as can be seen in the subsequent passages.
Threat Landscape
It was stated at the 2016 European Intelligence and Security Informatics
Conference, as cited in (Choo, 2008; Kshetri, 2010; Wall and Williams, 2013 &Yip,
Webber, Shadbolt, 2013), “Security and intelligence agencies in the UK, the USA and
Australia consider cybercrime one of the most critical threats today, putting it on the
same level as global terrorism (Mikhaylov & Frank, 2016, p.80).” The cyber threat
landscape continues to evolve with the growth of emerging technologies and the vast
speed at which these technologies work.
When did the first discussions of cyber policies first take place? Warner (2012)
clarified how the history of cybersecurity may be surprising to some in that the concern
for securing our data and technologies started long before most had the opportunity of
learning what security was about in the technology realm. Although there is not research
depicting exactly when cyber policies were first contemplated by government officials, it
was recognized at the government level, starting in the 1960’s, four threats involving our
technological advancements, which would eventually influence future policy in the cyber
realm (Warner, 2012).
As early as the 1960s, explained Warner (2012), it was known, through the
declassification of government documents, that sensitive data on computers could be
leaked by computers and should be protected, as well it was realized in the 1970s that
data could be stolen by attacks on computers. Military arsenals were discovered to be
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able to house computer attacks in the 1980s through the 1990s and the realization that if
we could accomplish computer attacks, then other countries may possess the same
abilities (Warner, 2012). Warner (2012) continued, by showing statements made by
Willis H. Ware, in 1967, at the Spring Joint Computer Conference on the ‘Security and
Privacy in Computer Systems’ that vulnerabilities to computer systems included humans,
hardware, software, and the organization of the system, all of which can contribute to the
consequences of an intrusion, which makes whatever is housed on the system available to
the intruder. It was also shown from the conference proceedings that looking to what
could be achieved through vulnerabilities should also be considered (Warner, 2012).
The following report identified the need for addressing the problems we are
dealing with today, with the vastness of the environment to be addressed. Warner (2012)
showed how it was understood by officials in the 1970s, through a classified report from
the RAND corporation, that there could be no security, through engineering, that would
be able to protect the technologies of the day and any type of sensitive data should not be
stored in the technological environment without excepting a profound risk of discovery,
as cited in the (Report of the Defense Science Board Task force on Computer Security,
Security Controls for Computer Systems, Ware Report, Feb.11, 1970, published by the
Office of the Director of Defense Research). One can only imagine what our cyber realm
would be like today if proactive security and policy measures were headed with
expedited actions among our international communities from the onset.
History can offer many insights for present-day cybersecurity issues. The human
propensity to commit crimes will continue to make up global environments, if the history
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of the world, as it is known today, continues to hold true, stated Williams (2015), in that
crimes of the past are crimes of the present, although committed using different
methodologies or approaches. A look at history showed how in 1944 the Office of
Strategic Services, put out a field manual entitled Simple Sabotage Field Manual, which
detailed the motivating factors for recruiting citizens for the cause during World War II,
including the personal benefits and sense of value and belonging (Williams, 2015). This
historic insight furnishes a framework that could help in discovering the motivating
factors behind the hacking mentality and whether these factors contribute to the criminal
acts of hacking.
Industrial espionage is a very big problem equating to approximately $300 billion
a year and growing, especially for international travelers and the loss of intellectual
property in international hotel rooms (Benice, 2012). Methods such as covert room
intrusions, which include physical entry to gain valuables, computer data copies, and
accessing items in the room safe are typical ways that are used to gain intellectual
property covertly and can provide information for potential blackmail (Benice, 2012).
Room stacking, which uses corner rooms to place wiring on the exterior of each level, so
it is not easily detected, provides for an additional method that is used to spy on
international travelers in gaining proprietary information (Benice, 2012; Richmond,
Morrison, & Covarrubias, 2017). These are only a few examples of what is taking place
on the international scene in relation to industrial espionage but can also be evaluated in
terms of individual privacy expectations (Richmond et al., 2017).
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A recent study provided by the RAND Corporation showed how the
cybercriminal markets are on the rise and can be more profitable than the drug trade,
given the ease in which hacking tools can be obtained and the ability to use private
anonymous networks, such as the dark net, for recruiting and business dealings (Ablon &
Libicki, 2015). Virtual tools and the Internet’s encryption provided a way for terrorist
organizations to spread malware without being detected, further assisting them in
accomplishing their ideological agendas (Gewirtz, 2016). Emergency communications
are now vulnerable to being compromised by terrorists and hackers who aim to disrupt
the system for gaining an advantage for their political or ideological goals, which holds
several implications for security professionals in the quest to secure critical environments
in the cases of emergency situations (Gewirtz, 2013).
Castelluccio (2017) elaborated on some of the infamous hacks during 2016,
including smart home devices, bitcoin losing over $75 million, and a digital bank robbery
taking approximately $81 million dollars of Bangladesh’s money from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, showing how profitable hacking attacks can be. The
interconnectivity of our technological devices provided the opportunities for intrusions,
especially through Wireless. It has been shown that children’s toys are vulnerable to
hacking, this was discovered when the kid connect services, through the Learning Lodge,
was compromised and millions of data records were taken, including over 6 million
records of children and a whole year of chatting communication records (Wide Range of
Devices Vulnerable to Hacking, 2015). Our online schools are also vulnerable to the
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risks of hacking, as shown from a study conducted on early E-learning systems (Mihai,
Pruna, & Petrica, 2017).
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), stated Juliadotter Hacking smart parking
meters (2016) from a study on how smart parking meters can be hacked, proved to be a
virtual avenue vulnerable to intrusions and the methodologies and motivations behind
these types of hacks can vary. The study found the impacts of a hack could include data
compromise, the disruption of service, and false data produced by manipulating the
network packets that could have many consequences in the disruption of service
(Hacking Smart Parking Meters, 2016). It was found in categorizing the attack of a
smart meter that the threat agents encompass motivations in the form of gaining data for
nefarious purposes, for political purposes, or for not wanting to pay for parking a vehicle
(Hacking Smart Parking Meters, 2016).
Autonomous vehicles have been developed and are being tested on roads today in
the United States, which provides questions to the safety of the technologies being used.
Jafarnejad et al. (2015) illustrated how there are security issues with connected vehicles
through a car hacking experiment with the best of the best technologies imbedded into
modern-day vehicles. The challenge concluded with many vulnerabilities that included
the hacker being able to manipulate the car in moving forwards or backwards,
manipulations with lowering the speed, and manipulating and changing data on the
dashboard, to name a few (Jafarbehad et al., 2015). These penetration tests showed that a
vehicle can be criminally hacked, providing for potentially serious security and safety
implications (Jafarbehad et al., 2015; Wenzel, 2017).
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A prototype quantum communications satellite, with a nickname of Micius,
explained Castelluccio (2016), designed to make communications extremely secure
through cryptology, was sent out by China in August of 2016. This showed how the
technological virtual realm is vulnerable in space and there is a need for extra security,
although this extra security could also provide a way for paths to be covered and not to be
traceable or detectable when examining virtual crimes, due to the cryptographic elements,
if this type of quantum technology is embraced by the criminal realm in the future. It has
been discovered that a 3-D printer hooked up to the Internet provided an avenue for
hacking to manipulate with the printer itself or specifically causing various defects to be
present within the created model (3D Printing is Vulnerable to Hackers, 2016).
There are technological security breaches every day, explained Mansfield-Devine
(2014), and the hacking incidents today are not on a small scale, they are industrial in
scale to what has taken place in previous years. Banks are a major target for criminal
hackers, due to the amount of money that can be exfiltrated (Mansfield-Devine, 2014).
Not only do criminal hacking incidents aim to target organizations for financial reasons,
hackers are joining forces to form what is termed a hacker collective, for purposes of
nation state hacking for any given purpose or agenda, including espionage, terrorism, and
electronic surveillance (Banks, 2017; Gerwirtz, 2011; Van DerWalt, 2017).
As-a-service, referring to hacking that is outsourced, stated Ablon and Liciki
(2015), has grown substantially over the years and can be very profitable. An infamous
Russian hacker, Peter Levashov, charged $500 for his services in sending phishing
attacks through email, using a profitably set up botnet network, involving multiple
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thousands of computers, that could be controlled remotely ($500, 2017). Peter Levashov
was arrested in Spain on April 14, 2017 and the Kelihos network, of approximately
100,000 malware infected private computers, and was taken down ($500, 2017).
Hacktivism is gaining momentum in our modern-day culture due to the
transparency and availability of data that can be used to target groups or individuals
(Gewirtz, 2011; Wood, 2015). The tools are readily available for these attacks, as well as
any other types of hacking attacks (Juliadotter, 2016). Gewirtz (2015) illustrated how
social media sites, including career related sites, are being used as an entry way into
virtual attacks, especially those dealing with critical infrastructure for any given political
cause. Illegal hacker activity in the cyber realm includes the Syrian civil war and the
Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), stated Mansfield-Devine (2014), where denial of service
attacks and social media account hijacking is common through the hacktivism mindset.
Since 2011, the private sector security organization, FireEye, showed how the Syrian
Malware Team initiates attacks through Remote Access Trojans (RAT), which aims to
take data in espionage attempts, having far more consequences than the activities of the
SEA.
Online social networks have proven to be a huge vector for online criminal
activity in the realm of black hat hackers and their recruitment of followers, as well as
with terrorist organizations and the recruitment of individuals for their cause (Al-khateeb,
Conlan, Agarwal1, Baggili, & Breitinger, 2016). Al-khateeb et al. (2016) continued to
show how these social media networks, vulnerable to criminal hacker networks and
terrorist organizations, has been taking place since the inception of online social
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networks. Tracing of communications for the recruitment activities of these groups has
proven to be very difficult to ascertain through the digital forensic methods and tools
used by many today, due to the amount of big data elements involved within the online
social networks (Al-khateeb et al., 2016).
Criminal hacking, in its various forms, is a global problem and continues to be a
major part of the cyber threat landscape. Burkart and McCourt (2017) detailed how
software packages designed to target individuals and various entities, for gaining all types
of information, is being purchased on a global scale within the confounds of the law,
since there is little regulatory deterrence outside of the regulatory frameworks put in
place for intellectual property rights. This growing phenomenon of cybersecurity
software, developed for addressing the need for offensive and defensive cybersecurity
methods in securing our networks and technologies, provides tools that can be used for
nefarious purposes, and has given rise to a political international economy of vendors and
clients capable of providing many types of surveillances (Burkhart & McCourt, 2017).
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have accelerated to the
point today were the technologies are being used to increase productivity and efficiency
on a number of legal fronts. On the other hand, Solomon (2020) illustrated how AI and
ML are being used as tools to help hackers in advancing their agenda’s for finding
vulnerabilities in systems and for creating high quality phishing campaigns in their
attempts to targeting influential individuals. The use of AI in the wrong hands is one of
the newer emerging threats, among the multitudes, in the threat landscape of criminal
hacking.
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Hacking
The terminology of hacking has been around for decades, depicting activities that
can be ethical or criminal. The methods used for hacking commonly consist of using
readily available tools or programs for penetrating technological devices. One form of
hacking is ethical hacking, which is used by many organizations and businesses in the
public and private sectors in testing for security vulnerabilities. Ethical hacking is
gaining in popularity all over the world in academia and for red and blue team
competitions, where a secured environment is used to test security vulnerabilities and for
gaining experience in the penetration testing environment. Hacking tools are readily
available, as well as hacking techniques are provided on the Internet through YouTube
videos and various forums, as well as through academic books and journals.
The acts of criminal hacking can be difficult to define, in that practically any type
of cybercrime could include the criminal acts of computer intrusion. Rashkovski,
Naumovskil, and Naumovskil (2016) expounded on the elements that define hacking, as
cited from (McQuade 2006;Taylor 1999), “… The standard broad definition of hacking
encompasses all forms of using technology for purposes for which that technology is not
intended” (Rashkovski et al., 2016, p.138). There are not universally accepted definitions
for the acts of criminal hacking, as posited by the cybersecurity community and law
enforcement officials, although definitions are put forth in some of the legislations
internationally, all with some intricate variances. Rashkoski et al. (2016) continued, as
cited by (McQuade 2006), “illegally gaining access to one or more computer systems by
abusing the security shortcomings and overcoming the security obstacles such as

41
passwords and firewalls in order to use or steal data or to insert new (external) program
functions” (Rashkoski et al., 2016, p. 139). “Under the CFAA, unauthorized access to a
protected computer is punishable by a fine or by imprisonment” (Schultze, 2016, p.245).
Lipoff (Hacking the house, 2016, Ch. 1) illustrated how approximately 45 years
ago, in the 70’s when hacking involved telephone networks, he hacked the doorbell to his
apartment to allow for his newspaper to be delivered through the locked lobby doors at
the timing he specified, enabling for his newspaper to be delivered to his apartment door.
Since then he has enhanced his methodologies for hacking his house, providing for
technological conveniences for controlling various intricacies between the two homes he
owns, which are separated by a five-hour airplane flight, seemingly being present at
either location at the same time, due to cameras, lighting, and other technological
illusions and manipulations (Hacking the house, 2016, Ch. 2-3).
Numerous computer intrusion tools have been developed over the last couple of
decades and are commonly used to accomplish the tasks of criminal hacking. Juliadottter
(2016) explained how the threat vectors, or the tools in this case, help in capturing Wi-Fi
traffic, enabling for the intrusion into a smart parking meter. A couple of the tools used
for this attack, other than a laptop with a wireless antenna, are aircrack-ng suite and
wireshark, which can be used for the entire process (Juliadotter, 2016). These tools are
readily available to acquire and are not only used by those committing computer crimes,
but they are also used by public and private sector entities for security purposes and in
virtual environments for the learning of ethical hacking techniques (Hausken, K. (2017).
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Bradbury (2011) detailed a step by step methodology for cracking a network by
scanning the environment to find vulnerabilities using various methods and penetration
testing tools. Gold (2012) described how hacking can be done with a cell phone just as
easy, if not more so, than with a laptop due to the advancements of software applications.
Wireless computer intrusions can be accomplished in any given public area without being
easily detected. These computer intrusion mobile apps can be used for ethical and
criminal hacking purposes (Gold, 2012).
An empirical study, conducted by Bento and Bento (2014), consisted of 60
months of statistical data, on a hacking model, displayed various activities encompassing
attacks through hacking. The model represented the following steps or variables,
(reconnaissance, malicious code, user compromise, root compromise, and denial of
service), as well as “two other variables that might have an impact on the growth of in
security breaches: number of hosts in the Internet, and broadband access to the Internet
by home and small business users” (Bento & Bento, 2014, p. 681).
The study found; “Reconnaissance (Step 1) is positively related to Malicious
Code (the preferred route to achieve initial access in Step 2), supporting the model’s
prediction that increased efforts to find vulnerable systems are associated with increased
attempts to break into them” (Bento & Bento, 2014, p 687). The study also found
“Success in achieving User Compromise in Step 2 is positively related to Root
Compromise (Step 3), which is compatible with hackers’ attempts toward escalation of
privilege.” (Bento & Bento, 2014, p. 687) The final findings showed “…a negative
relationship between Root Compromise and Denial of Service supports the idea that a
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hacker’s frustration at failing to gain control of a resource may be associated with trying
to sabotage it through DoS attacks” (Bento & Bento, 2014, 268).
Hacking, as noted by many, is an inquisitive quest. If hacking is examined from a
democracy viewpoint of having the ability to learn and become the best an individual can
be in a free environment, it can be seen how those interested in the technological
interworking’s of the technological landscape may have great motivational aptitude to
explore the intricacies of the field to personally excel in the quest for new knowledge,
while gaining a sense of power (Hunsinger & Schrock, 2016). Soderberg and Delfanti
(2015) extrapolated “…technical innovations spawned by hackers (modular software
code, mesh computer networks, distributed retrieval systems, private cryptography, etc.)
constitute the material infrastructure of today’s capitalism” (p.795).
Human curiosity traits are a part of human nature. As cited in (Oudshoorn &
Pinch 2005), “Hacking can be seen as a special case of a broader trend of citizen
engagement with science and user appropriation of technology” (Söderberg & Delfanti,
2015, p.794). There were no policies in place to discourage or deter the activities of
learning the intricacies of technology through hacking back when virtual hardware and
software were first developed. When and where did the landscape change to that of those
being on a quest to gain knowledge to that of exploiting technologies for personal gain, at
the expense of anybody or anything that might be in the way?
Denning (1983), a contributor to the Association for Computing Machinery
(AMC), posed questions, approximately 35 years ago, dealing with morality and clarity
of trespassing in the digital age. The question of trespassing in the virtual realm was hard
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to answer back then, stated Denning (1983), and the question is still trying to be
answered today, with all of the intertwining intricacies. More than 60 businesses were
reportedly broken into by a Milwaukee hacking club called “414 hackers”, which one
member was indicted for breaching the computers that held PII of cancer patients at
Sloan-Kettering (Denning, 1983). Denning (1983) analogized how computer intrusions,
like physical home invasions, physically accessing office filing cabinets, or somebody
stealing your automobile without your permission or knowledge.
Societies are dealing with the same issues today, but on a significantly larger
scale. It is hard to say how the hacking community has grown and proliferated
throughout the years. Computer intrusions have gained in notoriety, “2014 was the year
the hack went viral” (Ablon & Libicki, 2015, p. 143). How many hackers and/or groups
exist today among international communities? Is it possible to change a culture that has
evolved into what encompasses some aspects of all cultures today? The questions of the
study aimed to provide insight, as to what is perceived by stakeholders in today’s
cybersecurity realm, for the way in which we should proceed forward in the legislative
realm (Tang, Bagchi, & Jain, 2009).
Hacking in relation to privacy in the digital era has become a concern for many.
Interestingly, a reporter for the Surfacing column (Hiltner, 2018), showed how some
anonymity and privacy perceptions are moving in a different direction in the hacking
realm from what was once considered to be the norm of only using aliases, which can be
seen through interactions from hacker conferences, such as the annual hacking
conference held in Las Vegas, Nevada, Defcon. Hiltner illustrated how the pressures
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involving demands by the private and public sectors for experts in the cybersecurity field
and bug bounty programs, propelled by professional entities and the gamification arena,
have shown a present day need for various aspects of the hacking culture (Hiltner, 2018).
Trust among hackers has been studied with interesting results. Dupont, Côté,
Savine, and Décary-Hétu, (2016) provided results of a mixed methods study, which
analyzed trust among hackers in the hacking community, through examining
approximately 30,000 respondents “belonging to the largest computer hacking forum”
(Dupont et al., 2016, p.129). Findings from the analyzation of 449,478 collected
feedbacks, over a 27-month period, from a random qualitative examination of 25,000
feedbacks “…that a diverse set of behaviors, skills and attitudes trigger assessments of
trustworthiness” (Dupont et al., 2016).
What is portrayed in the news media on hacking should not be assumed to be
reality. Donner (2016) explored the gender gap of college students and cybercrime and
found that the male gender committed more online offenses in all categories studied,
including self-control and the amount of time spent in the virtual environment. The
quantitative study also found that both genders where equal in committing hacking and
digital piracy offenses, when Internet usage was high (Donner, 2016). The results of the
study found to be contrary to what is being reported in the media and journalist accounts,
while providing valuable “…insights into the complex mix of transactional, behavioral,
and cultural factors that establish someone’s trustworthiness” (Dupont et al. 2016, p.131).
Numerous elements contribute to the hacking culture. Reinis (2016) conducted a
worldwide study on the role of the environment encompassing an adolescent’s life, such
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as school, family, and the neighborhood one lives to see if these elements played any role
in the propensity to commit cybercrimes, specifically in the realm of hacking and illegal
downloads. The study involved 68,507 students from 30 countries and found “…parental
control, attachment to family, self-control, attitudes toward violence, attachment and
disorganization to school, and attachment, integration and disorganization of the
neighborhood as possible predictors of illegal downloading and hacking” (Reinis, 2016,
p.127). Other studies have been conducted, by experts in the field, on criminal hacking
behaviors and motivations (Chua and Holt, 2016; Young & Zhang, 2007; Bachmann, M.
(2010).
Motivational drive has been examined in many types of criminal cases in the
criminal justice field. Mansfield-Devine (2014) interviewed Amichai Shulman, who
stated we must look at the motivations behind the cybercriminal’s actions, understanding
why and how crimes are committed and who the targets are so it can be determined if
there are criminal or political motivations involved, or if both are motivating factors. It is
challenging to identify what the true motivations are behind various attacks, although
politically speaking there are tremendous advancements being made in offensive types of
attacks, showing the “industrialization of hacking” (Mansfield-Devine, 2014, p.14).
“Technologies sold by companies like Gamma Group and Hacking Team create crossborder fact patterns that can seem more complex than traditional physical-world attacks”
(Schultze, 2016, p. 895).
Similarly, motivation plays a pivotal role in understanding different cultures and
the tendencies for hacking. Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2008) interviewed 54 Israeli
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hackers and found their motivations and perceptions of who they are was instilled in them
when they were young and no matter what the consequences are for hacking, it does not
provide a deterrent for the acts of hacking. An interesting concept was found through a
study on hackers’ motivations, showing “Hackers appear to be more motivated by what
they dislike rather than by what they value” (Madarie, 2017, p. 78). Cultural values
global may pose a number of challenges when addressing multinational policy initiatives.
Privacy and Security
Security and privacy are fundamental today given the virtual landscape and it is
expected that individuals are afforded these assumed rights either by what is legislated or
through ethical assumptions (Greengard, 2012). Hooker and Pill (2016) showed how the
legal arena is facing tremendous issues and is on target for major policy change over the
years. A privacy case involving many data breaches with the Wyndham hotel group
established that the privacy breaches of consumer PII data were verifiable under the
Federal Trade Commission Act (Hooker & Pill, 2016). Privacy will be even more of an
issue with the proliferation of big data and the continuous increase of data compromise in
all virtual environments with connected devices, especially in the realm of the IoT, which
opens increasing risks for an individual’s privacy (Lindqvist & Neumann, 2017; Riga,
2017).
Data breaches are occurring on a regular basis, with the amount of comprised data
being reported in the billions according to recent reports, from 2005 through August 13,
2017 there were 7,798 data breaches compromising the data of 904,769,967 records (The
Identity Theft Resource Center). Din (2015) delineated between criminal breaches and
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data scraping and determined there should be additional laws put in place to better
distinguish between ethical and non-ethical data scraping, which should be criminalized
as a data breach through robust anti-hacking legislation. The compromised data being
collected through data scraping has privacy and security implications in our modern-day
society more than ever before. Security practitioners and privacy advocates will need to
help in the multidisciplinary approach of defining the security implications and helping in
developing policies to address the escalating problem of data hacking (Din, 2015).
Stone (2012) demonstrated, due to the present-day threat landscape, political
campaigns should consider keeping important information out of the virtual environment,
to help ensure there are no breaches that could have an impact on the efforts that have
been put forth toward any given election process. Considering the United States electoral
process being hacked prior to the final presidential election in 2016, Shackelford et al.
(2017) provided a study involving India, Germany, South Africa, Brazil, Estonia, and the
United States on how their election processes are secured. The study showed how voting
systems are vulnerable in many ways, depending on the systems being used and could
potentially alter the course of democracies around the world if voting outcomes were
compromised (Shackleford et al., 2017).
Certified public accounting (CPA) firms are buckling down to meet best standard
practice goals for protecting their customer’s data, in efforts to mitigate the risks of
criminal hackers, due to requirements from the regulatory realm (Lanz & Cohen, 2012).
The banking industry is working to speed up managing and mitigating risks in the
financial sector, to help ensure the privacy of customer’s data and PII (Mendelson, D., &
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Mendelson, 2017). Today banks are being breached not only for monetary gain, but for
the sensitive information that can be obtained for other purposes, such as for political
means (Mansfield-Devine, 2014).
Gupta and Mata-Toledo (2016) showed how computer intrusions can cause
irreparable damage to an individual through the access of personal information, likened
to somebody having a full x-ray of your body with all the intricacies found within. There
are grave consequences, in the legislation realm, for committing a physical assault on a
person, which can be likened to what happens in some cases when personal data is
exposed, it is like a vertical weapon of assault (Gupta & Mata-Toledo, 2016). From
another perspective Snell (2016) elucidated that the more transparent our virtual world
becomes, the more uncomfortable those that choose to lie and cheat will be, due to
technologies encompassing practically every aspect of our daily lives, and the amount of
data that is captured and preserved.
A number of critical infrastructures that countries rely heavily on for keeping
information private are vulnerable to hacking. In medicine, personal information can be
obtained or compromised through wireless hacking, as cited in (Denning et al., 2009) of
brain computer interface (BCI) technologies, which showed ethical, security, and legal
implications in relation to privacy (Ienca & Haselager, 2016). Stone (2012) demonstrated
political campaigns should consider keeping important information out of the virtual
environment, to help ensure there are no breaches that could have an impact on the efforts
that have been put forth toward any given election process. Mansfield-Devine (2014)
showed how advanced persistent threat attacks, from military groups in China, according
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to a private sector organization, Mandiant, and various groups of the like, are responsible
for the loss of PII of hospital patient records that accounted for patient data loss of 4.5
million records. PR Newswire (2017) reported that most law firms in the United States
are not knowledgeable to the threats they are vulnerable to and the number of times their
systems have been compromised by hackers in 2016, according to a Logic Force survey
involving 200 law firms.
The tools used for technical intrusions are available on many fronts throughout
the world, including retail markets. Burkart and McCourt (2017) described how there are
security and privacy concerns with packaged software that is being developed and
distributed, in markets that have minimal regulation in the technological realm, for the
purposes of online surveillance. The European Union addressed, through policy, the
protection of personally identifiable information in the form of a framework, which
regulates marketing of PII (Burkart & McCourt, 2017). This type of framework has not
been implemented in the United States, although there is hope for these issues to be
addressed through self-regulation in industry, which could potentially help in the
implementation of international treaties addressing the trade in these markets for
curtailing various security and privacy concerns, stated Burkart and McCourt (2017).
According to a Canadian expert Michele Mosca with the University of Waterloo’s
Institute for Quantum Computing, Co-founder and Program Director, stated Solomon
(Encryption breaking quantum computers getting closer, warns Canadian expert, 2017), it
is estimated that the RSA 2048 encryption could be broken within the next ten years, if
the one in seven chances estimate holds true from the Quantum Safe Workshop held in
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Toronto. The odds have now moved to a one in six chances, according to Mosca, and the
“quantum computer will break the way we do cyber security, the way we do crypto
(graphy) today, and we need to solve it” (as cited from Solomon in Encryption breaking
quantum computers getting closer, warns Canadian expert, 2017). Encryption today not
only helps secure our critical infrastructures, while providing privacy to individuals and
enterprises, it also provides a means for criminals to proceed with their criminal activities
without being detected (The Day the Cryptography Dies, 2017). Proactive coordinative
efforts should be taken to help ensure societies can continue with the encryption
technology that provides security in the virtual realm, while addressing the protection it
provides to the criminal element (The Day the Cryptography Dies, 2017).
Many security professionals have found that human error contributes a great deal
to security compromise. The human element in computer security is the weakest
element, explained Brink (10 Questions with Derek Brink, 2003), while passwords have
continued to present a problem in the virtual realm, an awareness approach to addressing
the vulnerability of the human element can provide for improvements in moving forward
in analyzing cybersecurity issues until there is a population that is mostly technological
savvy given due to their experiences from inception. “Technology is flawed, networks
are porous, and all of it is powered by error-prone humans” (Williams, 2017, p. 6).
Those committing virtual crimes can inflict a number of abuses on individuals,
businesses, organizations, government entities, and nation states, to name a few. Wilsem
(2013) described the connections between hacking and harassment and how the
psychological effects produced from the technological harassment, are like those

52
produced from violence crimes, but with more far reaching consequences, such as with
the hacking of personal information that can be used to destroy the reputation of an entity
or an individual. These types of crimes will grow and the technological landscape
continues to proliferate. Policy development should consider the lasting damages
computer-focused and computer- assisted crimes cause the individual and/or the entities
involved.
The future should offer improvements in cybersecurity, in that the populations
will have grown up with technological devices, providing for a population with a better
understanding toward addressing technological issues (Ablon & Lubicki, 2016). With
there being a total of 195 sovereign states around the world, global societies must
continue to take a defensive stance with cyber intrusions until legislative bodies draft
rules, and enforcement strategies for those rules, that will address all computer intrusion
crimes (Williams, 2017). Kosseff (2017) illustrated how the standards for privacy from
the European Commission have set the course as the highest of standards and have stated
that jurisdictions from the following countries have measured “to be adequate: Andorra,
Argentina, Canada, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and Uruguay (Kosseff, 2017, Chapter 10).
Policy and Law
Government policy making has been noted by many to be slow, rather than
expedient, when tackling issues that need to be addressed in the policy realm, in general.
Sabett (2016) compared Moore’s law with the legislation implementation showing how
some laws in the United States are outdated by the time they are implemented as with the
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), although Moore’s law has stood the test of time and proven its predictability.
To effectively prosecute crimes using the ECPA and the CFAA there needs to be a very
good understanding of how security works in the cyber realm (Sabett, 2016). This where
a multidisciplinary approach comprising of subject matter experts may be beneficial in
addressing ongoing multinational coordinative legislation initiatives.
Cyber policy legislation has gained attention over the years with the evolving
nature of technologies. The United States National Security Act of 1947 and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 predates the terminology of cybersecurity law,
although these Acts have been revised since then, valuable insights can be gained from
revisiting and closely examining documents of the past for establishing future policies
(Williams, 2015). The United States held many hearings starting in 1985 to accomplish
what was later legislated as the Computer Security Act of 1987, which allowed for the
National Security Agency to protect networks in relation to national security and for the
National Bureau of Standards to protect networks in relation to federal entities, other than
the Department of Defense (Warner, 2012).
History has shown, expressed Warner (2012), the time in which it has taken for
successfully addressing the cybersecurity issues of today, given U.S. government
officials were being briefed in the 1960s. The difficulty is addressing these technological
issues was overwhelming at the time for, “…for any one agency or department to solve
on its own, and too complicated for the White House and Capitol Hill to solve with any
single bill or edict” (Warner, 2012, p.799). The time element will continue to pose
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challenges in the legislative realm given the speed at which newer technologies are being
developed.
In February of 2016 the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) was
revealed in the by the U.S. government providing a framework in dealing with today’s
computer intrusions, stated which included “enhance cybersecurity awareness and
protections, protect privacy, maintain public safety as well as economic and national
security, and empower Americans to take better control of their digital security (as cited
from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheetcybersecurity-national-action-plan)” stated Sabett (2017). The Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA) was released in 2016 providing for voluntarily sharing information,
in relation to cybersecurity, without having to fear legal repercussions (Sabett, 2017).
On June 6, 2016, the Boston Global Forum announced, “Leaders at the G7
Summit approved the first international stand-alone agreement on cybersecurity,
including data protection and Internet governance”
(http://bostonglobalforum.org/2016/06/g7-leaders-produce-historic-cybersecurityagreement/)” The group of 7 (G7), the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the United
States, Canada, Japan, and Italy, have been working to establish common ground for
addressing human rights issues in relation to the cyber realm, which includes privacy and
the continuation of information and communication technology freedoms (Shackleford,
2017, a). Shackleford (2017a) continued to show how there is a need for coordinative
efforts toward “verification, transparency, and extraterritoriality in the sustainable due
diligence context comprising cybersecurity, data privacy, and human rights
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considerations” (Shackleford, 2017a, pp.884-885). Shackleford (2017a) further
illustrated what the consequences would be if we choose not to address issues of due
diligence in cybersecurity, in that we will be facing, as cited from (Bendiek, supra note
75, at 32) a “collision course for different national legal systems, which would encourage
the fragmentation of the global economic space and the Internet” (Shackleford, 2017a, p.
885).
Shackleford et al. (2017) illustrated how some countries are developing policies
and legislation to address the cyber vulnerabilities of their critical infrastructures. In the
context of the election processes around the world, which could be appropriated as
critical infrastructures, information sharing among international bodies and a physical
paper audit trail of every individual vote, provides a couple of elements that can be
addressed in the electoral processes for helping to mitigate the inherent risks involved in
voting processes, while improving the election infrastructures around the world
(Shackleford et al., 2017). McMillan (2009) showed how, just prior to China’s
strengthened cyber laws, some professionals in IT chose to take the crime route during a
time of economic struggle in china. An approach of broadening the definition of
cybercrime and extending the penalties to fit the “tremendous social harm” (as from
McMillian, 2009, p. 74) has been taken to help mitigate the virtual crimes the world is
facing today.
International law considers universal jurisdiction, which provides nation state
courts the ability to hold criminal actors accountable for their crimes through prosecution,
although recent legislations have prompted for more stringent guidelines for addressing
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the intricacies involved in universal jurisdiction prosecutions and international relations
(International Law - Universal Jurisdiction - United Kingdom Adds Barrier to Private
Prosecution of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes, 2012). An example can be seen through
The United Kingdom Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011, which has
made it more difficult for universal jurisdiction cases to work in some cases given a new
requirement of “consent of the U.K. Director of Public Prosecutions before a U.K. court
can issue a privately sought arrest warrant for universal jurisdiction offenses. The
requirement separates universal jurisdiction crimes from the arrest warrant procedures for
domestic crimes in the United Kingdom” (International Law - Universal Jurisdiction United Kingdom Adds Barrier to Private Prosecution of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes,
2012).
A new approach for addressing the governance problems in securing our
information, proposed Elkin-Korerd and Haber (2016), showed how a nonbiased
oversight body could provide the needed insight on how information is used in the everincreasing world of transparency, rather than trying to track down how the information
was procured. For civilian liberties and global security to be equally addressed, online
intermediaries and public-private partnerships, along with an oversight body providing a
proxy for governance, would allow governmental agencies the needed information from
networks and distributed networks for addressing criminal acts without overstepping the
boundaries of civil liberties (Elkin-Korerd & Haber, 2016).
Trotta (2017) explained how a mixture of expert technocrat knowledge, coupled
with the knowledge of the citizenry, enhances the policy making process for legislators
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by helping to ensure policy solutions are brought to the table. Visher and Weisburd
(1998) showed how there needs to be tailored approaches for crime prevention strategies,
to help ensure recidivism rates decrease and are potentially alleviated. These approaches
should involve concerted efforts among stakeholders in establishing and implementing
unique programs with precise elements for addressing a specific type of crime (Visher &
Weisburd, 1998).
The General Data and Privacy Regulation (GDPR), put into full force on May 25,
2018, provides strict penalties for companies not adhering to the regulation in the EU, as
well as for companies that do business with the EU abroad. Goddard (2017), Director of
policy and Standards, MRS, and Director of Policy and Communications for EFAMRO,
states “GDPR goes beyond current law in demanding higher standards for organisations
processing data – but these higher standards are philosophically in line with best practice
and ethical approaches that are practiced by research practitioners” Goddard (2017) goes
on to state, “GDPR builds on transparency and trust enshrined in national and
international codes with best practices that put the interests of research participants
rightfully at the center” (2017, p. 705).
The 2014 Sony breach provided an example of how international law has not been
able to address nation state cyber-attacks, according to many expert legal examinations of
the international law, for assigning criminal culpability for the actions taken by North
Korea in response to a scheduled release of the movie The Interview (Shackelford, 2017b;
Sullivan, 2015; & Walton, 2017 ). Contrary to some scholarly thoughts and proposals of
international frameworks for addressing cyberspace attacks through international law and
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treaties, Walton (2017, p. 1460) suggested a liability and duty centered approach, which
would specifically address “low intensity” destructive cyber-attacks that fall outside of
what is currently addressed and understood by many under international law. This
approach “that derives from a preexisting but underutilized source of international law:
liability for transboundary harm” (Walton, 2017, p.1464), would use the “harm” element
in relation to a low-intensity cyber-attacks from any nation state, with a special focus on
the responsibilities of the state, providing for consideration for the acts to be criminal
through international law (Walton, 2017).
Existing laws and treaties can be used to address our current cybersecurity issues
stated Shackelford (2017b), we can look at “…how the public law of cyber peace may be
combined with private international law to create the legal foundation for a global culture
of cybersecurity (Shackelford, 2017b, p.9) 1st article.” The International
Telecommunication Union treaty has been used, along with bilateral and multilateral
treaties related to investments and trade, to provide a case for prosecuting private entities
for cyber-attacks internationally (Shackelford, 2017b). Shackelford (2017b) showed how
G20 has been instrumental in promoting the law of cyber peace internationally by
examining the conduct of nation states in the virtual realm, including the acts of
espionage and critical infrastructure protection in a holistic collaborative forum.
Considering the role each nation plays for responsibly addressing the security of
the citizenry and the efforts put forth by normative powers in promoting a modicum of
peace throughout conflict stricken global societies, Bengtsson and Elgstrom (2012)
illustrated how the EU exemplifies a normative power, in relation to role theory, in
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showing what is expected from the EU in helping to provide solutions for international
issues in the realm of international relations. Although, the role of the EU is sometimes
perceived in conflict to what is expected from the national actor in the context of role
theory and how it plays out on the international scene, the EU is positively setting the
stage for additional nation states to come on the scene in their modern-day attempts in
accepting and implementing a democracy landscape on some fronts (Bengtsson &
Elgstrom, 2012).
The role of international leaders will be instrumental in propelling change in the
cyber policy realm. Abigbuo (2007) stated, as cited from (Holsti, 1970), how role theory
provides a fundamental impetus for contributing to foreign policy efforts and positively
adding to the models of International Relations (IR) theories, including how
multidisciplinary leaders perceive their role on the political scene and what is expected in
relation to their participation. Role theory in foreign policy, illustrated Adigbuo (2007),
as cited from (Adigbuo, 2005; LePrestre, 1997), encompasses concepts of any of the
following elements; behaviors that are expected, the rank of any given participatory
individual, or the acts of an influencer or contributor. Role theory, with its
multidisciplinary approach, provides a positive focus for moving forward with how
Nigeria will define its role among national leaders for dealing with policy issues
(Adigbuo, 2007).
International cooperation efforts have been underway on several fronts, as
reported in the Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 2017 SecretaryGenerals’ Report to Ministers, in working with stakeholders in addressing global issues,
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since the inception of the OECD over 50 years ago. Working multilaterally with the
cooperation of a wide array of stakeholders, including Public Private Partnerships (PPP),
to address the issues relating to the present-day technological landscape and emerging
technology issues (Secretary-Generals’ Report to Ministers, OECD, 2017). The Strategic
Orientations of the Secretary-General, Meeting of the OECD Council at the Ministerial
Level, in June 2017 provided a strategic framework overview for establishing improved
policies and multilateral cooperation and insights for the wellbeing of global
communities, examining exclusion obstacles, and the use of metrics for driving better
decision making processes, among the international collective body of 35 countries, for
strengthening multilateral cooperation efforts toward addressing global issues and
establishing international policies.
International coordinated efforts have continued toward an international
consensus on some fronts, as touched upon in chapter 1. While there are international
initiatives underway to secure the cyber realm, including strategies being developed to
address the intricacies involved in cyber-criminal activities, confusion exists on how the
global community should proceed forward in confronting the problems the world is
facing today in cyberspace (Weber & Studer, 2016). There continues to be a gap in
internationally developed and adopted policy frameworks for addressing today’s
cybercrimes and our virtual security (Weber & Studer, 2016). Upol (2014) explained
how the Group of Eight organization became the Group of Seven after Russia was not
invited back due to their involvement in the Ukraine crisis and Russia taking Crimea. It
was reported “…the G7 leaders issued a statement saying, ‘international law prohibits the
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acquisition of part or all of another state’s territory through coercion or force” (Upol,
2014, para. 1).
Garris (2017) illustrated the need for a collaboration of international entities for
capturing major cybercrime organizations. As cited from (Germano, 2014), public and
private partnerships are essential for addressing cyber threats but there is a need to
overcome the obstacles that are preventing fruition of these partnerships, which include
control issues in relation to incident response, liability in the evolutionary regulatory
realm, cross border criminal investigations, and disclosure issues (Garris, 2017). In the
United States, elaborated Schultze (2016), technological crimes can be prosecuted
without the creation of new laws by using the intricacies of established legislations that
were originally implemented for addressing traditional crimes, such as The Wiretap Act,
which addresses intrusive technologies, such as spyware, and The Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act (FISA), which recognizes various exceptions to immunity. “Under the
CFAA, unauthorized access to a protected computer is punishable by a fine or by
imprisonment” (Schultze, 2016, p.245).
Work has been accomplished on a number of fronts in addressing criminal
hacking. According to Kosseff (2017) various laws in the United States are used to help
authorities in prosecuting the crimes of criminal hacking. The following are laws that
have helped in bringing counts of violations against various entities, including single
count violations, which carry prison sentences of approximately 10 years or more.
•

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

•

State Computer Hacking Laws
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•

Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act

•

Economic Espionage Act

•

Stored Communication Act (section 2701)

Kosseff (2017) continued to elaborate how some nations have done more than the
U.S. in providing a legal framework for regulating data security and privacy. The
following five countries, which are the largest counties for U.S. trading, have established
regulations for addressing cybersecurity: European Union implemented the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) that updated their 1995 privacy law, Canada uses the
Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) as their primary data
security and privacy law, China uses the Consumer Protection Law, Mexico uses eight
principals, which requires consent through various methods for undeniable clarity, and
Japan mostly uses the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) to govern
their data security and privacy (Kosseff, 2017).
There is a good deal of work ahead in policy making for determining all the
variables that make up criminal hacking, including the various methods used in the
exploits. Victimization of hacking is an area with little research, although it should be
fundamentally considered when approaching the policies that are established for
punishing the offenses of criminal hacking, elucidated Wilsem (2013). There is the need
for additional research in the motivating factors behind victimizing through hacking
and/or malware infections, to establish more effective policies for computer intrusions,
whether they are computer focused crimes or computer assisted crimes (Wilsem, 2013).
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Rashkovski et al. (2016) displayed how the Republic of Macedonia has been
affected by punishable cybercrimes, which includes those that have been identified in
relation to information and communication technologies that encompass the networks of
the Internet, computers and connected devices, and mobile devices. The Republic of
Macedonia has the least in numbers of Internet users, according to Rashkovski et al.
(2016) study, but ranked second, after the United States, in the number of crimes
reported. Although the Republic of Macedonia’s legislative realm is moving forward
addressing cybercrime, with the best standards in motion today throughout the world,
Rashkovski et al. (2016) explained there is more needed to help in the global efforts, by
including the authorities of Macedonia in global efforts toward finding solutions for
adverting the criminal activities and enforcing more stringent strategies in addressing and
mitigating the effects of cybercrime.
Pun (2017) described cyber espionage as being like the Cold War espionage with
aircraft spying activities, where “…malware deployed can be changed on-the-fly to
achieve a destructive capacity rather than mere surveillance (and often does so to wipe its
traces from the hardware). For the victim state in both cases, there is fear the vehicle is
intended for combat rather than surveillance” (2017, p.375). On Sept. 25, 2015 it was
revealed that the United States and China had come to an agreement that each country
would not steal trade secrets and would put forth concerted efforts to help ensure trade
and economic proprietary information is not gained through cyber theft (The Latest: US,
China Agree Not to Steal Trade Secrets, 2015). More recently Kennedy and Xiaoyan
(2017) stated China just past cybersecurity law.
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Many of the same hacking tools and techniques used by law enforcement entities
are being used by criminals (Sommer, 2006). A study proposed a policy approach for the
criminalization of computer intrusion tools, although it was noted there would be an
impact felt in the areas outside of law enforcement, including those entities that use
penetration tools in the academic environment and for ethical business purposes
(Sommer, 2006). Ghappour (2017) pointed out how a standard framework needs to be
adopted to help ensure there is consistency in the practices of cross-border investigation,
which will play an important role in the policy environment for establishing and reaching
a uniform framework for the crimes of criminal hacking (Hui, Kim, & Wang, 2017).
Criminal hacking investigations can be investigated and speedily addressed
legislatively through various international assistance channels. These channels involve
using informal cooperation methods of business to business investigative contacts, in the
public or private sectors, or through formal cooperation methods, which involve a more
in-depth approach of working with national governments and may require mutual legal
assistance through a treaty, which is required for any type of digital evidence transfers
relating to interception of communications and search and seizures (How Businesses Can
Speed up International Cybercrime Investigations, 2017). Newer approaches, in
addressing rulemaking and policies holistically, on a global scale, in the cyber realm
could offer even more investigative efficiencies for the future.
“The individual-agent approach to prosecuting hackers recently bore its first fruit.
On March 22, 2016 in the United States v. Su Bin, a Chinese businessman living in
Canada agreed to plead guilty to criminal violations of the computer Fraud and Abuse
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Act… “(Schultze, 2016 p. 245). This espionage hacking incident was criminalized for
compromising Boeing, a United States aircraft company, servers and stealing trade
secrets (Schultze, 2016). Although initiatives have been underway in addressing
cybercrime, stated Greengard (2012), China and Russia are not represented in one of the
more prominent initiative of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. With
no global policy in sight for addressing cybercrime, we have much to work on, including
the “increasing continuous battle over rights, responsibilities, and resources” (Greengard,
2012).
The Black Report, a study involving a survey of professional penetration testers,
hackers, and incident responders, led by Pogue (2018), addressed the hacking ability
from the diverse population of 112 respondents. The study showed 34 percent of the
respondents said they have been hacking 10 or more years and approximately 67 percent
of the respondents said they spent more than 10 hours a week “bypassing IT security
systems” (Progue, The Black Report, 2018, p. 9). Future studies may garner additional
insights toward the number of individuals, among the global population, who have
technical abilities and the skills required to hack into secured systems. These studies may
offer various perspectives for the legislative realm in addressing how policies should be
built, in relation to criminal hacking offenses, and what defines criminal hacking
offenses, as a universal policy.
Hacking skills can be very valuable in today’s virtual landscape environment,
provided they are used in ethical ways. Various public and private sector entities have
incorporated the skills of hackers, through crowdsourced programs, to help find
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cybersecurity vulnerabilities in systems. The United States Air Force initiated a program
that allowed hackers to hack Air Force systems in efforts to find vulnerabilities, and how
this structured program has continued on to its third round of inviting hackers to hack the
Air Force, through an invitation to 191 countries, for the opportunity to find
vulnerabilities in a system recently moved to the virtual cloud (Cordell, 2018).
Although ethical hackers provide a great service in helping companies with their
cybersecurity needs, new creative approaches are needed for addressing the intricacies
associated with criminal hacking. Huang, Siegel, and Madnick (2018) illustrated crimes
related to various hacking services and innovations have grown to several trillion dollars
and are estimated to reach approximately six trillion over the next couple of years (as
cited from Steve Morgan, 2016 – Hackerpocalypse: A Cybercrime Revelation. Technical
Report. Cybersecurity Ventures. 1-24). With approximately one third of companies being
touched by cybercrime, policies, outside of the realm of protection protocols, are needed
to encourage additional proactive actions to help curtail the effectiveness of the
cybercrime business (Huang et al., 2018).
There is need to holistically understand the hacking culture today in order to
successfully address solutions to the problem of criminal hacking. A study, conducted by
Absolute Software Corporation, found approximately one third of the IT personnel in the
United States, surveyed admitted to hacking in their organization (2016, February 19).
Additionally, the study showed among the information security practitioner respondents,
that those between the ages of 18-44 were more apt to hack into their own organization
(415 percent of respondents between the ages of 18-44) and those respondents 45 years of
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age and older were less likely to hack into their own organization (12 percent of
respondents aged 45 and older).
There are differing opinions on the types of policies that should be implemented
for punishing the crimes of criminal hacking. In examining the disparities of penalties
associated with various computer intrusion crimes, such as with hacktivism and
Anonymous, Tomblin and Jenion (2016) argued that policy makers and sentencing
imposed by justice systems around the world should be minimized in relation to recent
trends of stricter punishments. A study conducted using age and crime, the curve showed
most offenses lesson or desist as individuals age out of their teens and twenties, which
offers valuable insight for policy makers in evaluating the effectiveness of deterrence
methods (Tomblin & Jenion, 2016).
Summary and Conclusions
The major themes covered in the literature touch on various aspects of
cybercrime, privacy, security, the hacking culture, and multinational policies and laws in
the cybersecurity realm, which provided an in-depth look at the threat landscape of the
technological realm for future policy considerations. The threat landscape, consisting of
individual and group actors of criminal hacking, the methodologies and tools used to
accomplish their missions, and the targets they aim to compromise, as illustrated by
Weber and Studer (2016), should be understood holistically, with a team of subject
matter experts for appropriately addressing a framework for international policy
implementation for the criminal activities of hacking. The threat landscape encompasses
a vast array of interconnected elements, including the political arena, industry, nation
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state policies, cultural differences, and the propagation of the hacking community, all of
which play some role, on the international scene, in relation to intrusions in the
technological realm (Walden, 2004).
There is much to sift through when holistically addressing policies related to the
acts of criminal hacking, and for consideration to be implemented at the international
level. Those that commit the crimes, their methods, and their targets furnishes some of
the elements needed for developing a framework for an international policy standard
(Banks, 2017; Thaw, 2014). It is not known the extent in which criminal hacking takes
place on a personal level through the various methods used for accessing all types of
virtual technologies, although studies have shown, through private sector organization
reports, that the number of network intrusions are continuously escalating.
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need
for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with
the act of criminal hacking. This study provided for extended knowledge to be gained in
the cybersecurity realm, consisting of data contributions among multidisciplinary
individuals on criminalization standards for the acts of technological intrusion crimes.
The questions of the study furnished a foundation that was examined using descriptive
and inferential statistics that provided the perceptions among individual stakeholders in
the public and private sectors. An identification of differential standards for the
definitions and punishments of criminal hacking were gained in hopes to help propel
global awareness of the virtual threat landscape involving criminal hacking and to
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promote international efforts for working in concert to establish policy solutions that can
be used by all communities that are connected to the borderless cyber realm.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need
for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with
the act of criminal hacking. In this study, I sought to find meaningful relationships
between the independent and dependent variables of the study (see Appendix A).
Valuable insights were gained from the individuals surveyed about their attitudes toward
the need for an international law in defining and penalizing criminal hacking, which
could potentially be used to promote further research in the arena of international
cooperation efforts toward implementing consistent universal policies and laws
addressing criminal hacking in the borderless realm of information and communication
technologies.
This chapter consists of the research design and rationale, methodology, data
analysis plan, threats to validity, ethical procedures, and a summary of the chapter. The
research design addressed the research scientifically, using descriptive and inferential
research. The logic behind the methodology in participant selection included the
knowledge of those involved in the entities chosen as well as the expertise of individual
stakeholders relevant in the discipline of the study.
The components in the published instrumentation, provided through the Qualtrics
statistical platform Stats iQ, addressed reliability and validity, while providing reliability
evidence of internal consistency and testing and retesting, as well as validity evidence
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through predictive and construct validity. Instrumentation sufficiency was established
through the Qualtrics survey platform to help ensure each respondent had the ability to
appropriately provide answers for the research questions of the study. Survey rating
scales, including Likert and semantic differential scales, were used to address the study
from a deductive reasoning approach. The data analysis plan encompassed the use of the
Qualtrics statistical software for the survey and the analysis of the data. Ethical
procedures were explained and approached using best standard practices put forth by the
official institutional Internal Review Board (IRB), which included a consent form.
The setting involved a structured survey for quantitative data collection accessed
through the reputable Qualtrics platform, which played a fundamental part in the
structure of the research design for the study. Individual stakeholders in the public and
private sectors, with some affiliation to cybersecurity through various organizations (see
Appendix A), and their networking and social groups were provided survey questions
through an anonymous link. These individual respondents represented a unique
knowledge base in the cybersecurity realm, which encompassed various perspectives in
relation to the study questions.
The survey (see Appendix B) was sent to security organizations and LinkedIn
networks in cybersecurity, where the memberships and networks were made up of a vast
array of individuals from public and private sectors, including various representatives
from critical infrastructure sectors. These multidisciplinary memberships provided
professional insights to the study with their expertise and knowledge for addressing the
virtual context of the study in relation to the criminal acts of technological intrusions and
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compromise, with an understanding that these acts can affect any given critical
infrastructure or society.
The quantitative study examined individual attitudes toward an international law
governing the cyber realm in relation to defining criminal hacking and the penalties
associated with the act, and if there is a difference in the attitudes of individual
respondents among public and private sectors. The independent variables of the study
included age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking
ability, and education, which related to the hypotheses by providing, through correlation,
what the relationship is between the dependent variables, of attitudes toward the need for
international laws for defining criminal hacking and penalties, and the individuals
associated with the public and private sectors, for the question of the study (see Appendix
A).
Research Design and Rationale
Creswell (2016) advised detailing the core principles that should be included in
the research design, including concerted efforts toward development, analysis of the
problem, proactive planning of the research process through documentation, and suitable
measures taken for implementing and evaluating the generalized conclusions through
critical reasoning. This study provided a framework that incorporated best standard
practices throughout the research process. Kanji (2006) explained that tests are not to be
designed to gain an approval or disapproval of hypotheses but to show the hypotheses
being tested are “untenable as it leads to an unsatisfactorily small probability” (p. 2).
Osborne (2008, 2017) illustrated how best practices are crucial in research studies, which
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helps provide informative and trustworthy results, provided the communication method is
effective when demonstrating the results.
Mills (1992) illustrated the importance of understanding that science seeks the
truth through an objective means, while questions of value are intended to be a part of the
policy process, including problems associated with technological progress. Policy issues
require concerted efforts between scientists and policy makers to define and address
fundamental technical and policy elements, including the scientific community putting
facts in order to assess problems and potential solutions; policy makers have the task of
proposing effective legislation after considering all the varying values put forth (Mills,
1992). In the policy realm, decision makers have obligations to future generations in
making the best decisions with relevant available information involving the expertise of
various entities in the scientific community (Mills, 1992).
Due to the evolving nature of the threat landscape in the cyber world, issues are
addressed in relation to the need for concerted unified global efforts in collectively
coordinating universally consistent policies for the penalties of criminal hacking. The
central concept of the study revolved around exploring the attitudes of individuals among
the public and private sectors on the need to have an international law for defining
criminal hacking, the need to have an international law for the punishments of criminal
hacking, and to what extent the acts of criminal hacking should be penalized. Morse,
Niehaus, Wolfe, and Wilkins (2006) clarified how a theoretical drive should be clearly
defined in the study, which helps to ensure the direction of the research study is on track
within the specific design.
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Role theory was used as the theoretical drive to show how roles play a critical part
in addressing the problems of criminal hacking. The rationale for the design of the study
was chosen to gain perceptions and insights from the individual participant data for
evaluating the need for an international law for defining criminal hacking and the
punishments for the crimes, as well as fulfilling a gap in the literature in addressing
international unified policy standards in the technological realm.
Structured closed-end question surveys were made available via e-mail invitation
to various participants with ties to the cybersecurity realm to the memberships of several
security organizations on behalf of the researcher, their networking groups, and LinkedIn
networking groups with a cybersecurity professional presence served as the research
sampling units. There was not a relationship of power over any of the proposed subjects
for the study. The use of anonymous data collection, through a virtual survey, helped in
obtaining responses that were accurate from the individual respondents. Any biases were
managed by conducting the study in an objective manner, helping to ensure the true
results of the nonexperimental research study were provided.
Study Variables
The following provides the independent variables (IVs), dependent variables
(DVs), and groups for the study (See Appendix A).
DVs: The dependent variables for the study are:
o

DV1: Attitudes toward the need for one international law for defining

criminal hacking.
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o

DV2: Attitudes toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be

addressed under one international law?
o

DV3: Attitudes toward the extent that criminal hacking should be

penalized, given it would be implemented globally?
The independent variables for the study are:
o

IV1 – Age group (ratio scale)

o

IV2 – Ethnicity (nominal)

o

IV3 – Gender (dichotomous)

o

IV4 – Infrastructure sector affiliation (nominal)

o

IV5 – Technical hacking ability (dichotomous)

o

IV6 – Education (nominal)

The groups for the study are:
Groups – Employment sector (nominal)
o

Public sector

o

Private sector
Methodology

Population
The population for the study targeted multidisciplinary professionals from the
public and private sectors who worked directly, indirectly, or had some knowledge in the
security, cybersecurity, and legislative realms, as well as their networking groups and
LinkedIn networks. Additionally, the Walden Research Participant Pool was approved
and provided for an additional six respondents. The back-up sampling strategy was to
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gain a sample population through the Qualtrics statistical platform, which supplies survey
respondents for a charge, this option was not used in that there was an adequate number
of respondents, gained through the initial sampling strategy. The initial sampling frame
was chosen because the population is necessary for the scope of the study in gaining a
representation of the knowledge base that made up those that can influence policy
initiatives.
Sampling and Procedures
For this quantitative study, the sample size was determined prior to the
dissemination of this survey. To determine the sample size the target population was
determined, those that have some affiliation with the cybersecurity community. The
population size can be hard to estimate in many cases and is unknown for the parameters
of this study, therefore a standard equation was used to statistically determine the sample
size.
The confidence level for the study was set at 95%, which is a good and
recommended standard for scholarly studies, according to many statistical experts. 95%
provides a Z Score that equals 1.96, for the numerical portion of the statistical equation
for calculating the sample size, according to Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Determining Sample
Size, par. 5, retrieved from https://www.qualtrics.com/experiencemanagement/research/determine-sample-size/). The standard of deviation, or the
variance expected in the survey responses, was set at the standard of .5, given the
adequate sample size. The margin of error, also known as the confidence interval, was set
at +/- 5%. The following standard equation involving the z-score, standard of deviation,
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and the confidence interval was used to determine the sample size for an unknown
population size*(Qualtrics, Determining Sample Size, para. 4, retrieved from
https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-management/research/determine-sample-size/).
Necessary Sample Size = (Z-score)² * StdDev*(1-StdDev) / (margin of error)²
Using the above standard equation, with the parameters set for the study shown
above, the following provides the statistical equation from the sample size formula
according to the Qualtrics sample size calculation (Qualtrics, Determining Sample Size,
para 6, retrieved from https://www.qualtrics.com/experiencemanagement/research/determine-sample-size/).
((1.96)² x .5(.5)) / (.05)²
(3.8416 x .25) / .0025
.9604 / .0025
384.16
385
It is sometimes necessary for researchers to adjust the parameters a bit for sample
sizes that are too large, which increases the chances for errors from the sampling, which
can be done by increasing your margin of error or decreasing your confidence level
(Qualtrics, Determining Sample Size, retrieved from
https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-management/research/determine-sample-size/).
Similarly, Raosoft provided a sample size calculator that allows researchers to
input the percentages of the margin of error (showing 5% as a common choice),
confidence level (showing 90%, 95%, or 99% as choices), population size (using 20,000
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for unknown population sizes), and response distribution, or standard of deviation at .5
(Raosoft Sample Size Calculator, retrieved from
http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html). Using 5% as a margin of error to accept, 95%
as the confidence level, 20,000 for the unknown population size, and 50% as the standard
of deviation, the recommended sample size is 377 (Raosoft Sample Size Calculator,
retrieved from http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html).
The quantitative survey was sent out to national, international, and statewide
organizations that hold membership populations in the security realm as a sample
population through the executive leadership of a number of non-profit organizations.
Additional opportunities for the networking groups of these groups to be surveyed
through referral sampling, was used as an additional sample for the sample population.
An email was sent to these organizations and LinkedIn network groups inviting
individual participation in the survey.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection included
reaching out to executive board members of the various security organizations to gain
approval to sample their membership population, which included public and private
sectors individuals involved in various cybersecurity organizations. An email was sent to
the members of these organizations by the leadership of the organization on behalf of the
researcher, and LinkedIn network groups inviting individual participation in the survey.
Surveys were distributed and gained through a reputable survey platform,
Qualtrics single user license, for the study. This survey platform allowed for a number of
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distributions, if needed, as a back-up for a sample population for the study. The manual
distribution, through the platform, provided a generic survey link and collected all
responses anonymously. To help ensure respondents did not use the survey link multiple
times, the option tab was selected, which prevented ballot box stuffing.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
The quantitative instrumentation consisted of a structured survey with closed
ended questions using survey Likert rating scales. The survey (see Appendix B)
consisted of a researcher-developed questionnaire consisting of Likert and semantic
differential rating scales administered through Qualtrics, a published reputable survey
software platform. Using Qualtrics single user student license and Stats iQ (Qualtrics,
Provo, UT, 2019 -2020) assisted in establishing consistency measures internally through
the correlation of the data sets, including measures that addressed similarities within the
questions being measured.
Operationalization for Variables
The independent variables (IVs), dependent variables (DVs), and groups for the
study were operationalized and measured in a number of ways to show the correlations
and relationship between variables. Independent Variables were nominally and
dichotomously measured, as well as through ratio scale measurement. The independent
variables, including the groups of the study, and the dependent variables from the survey
results were coded for statistical analyses for determining the outcomes for the questions
of the study.
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Data Analysis Plan
Qualtrics stats IQ statistical software was used for the analysis for the research
study. Validating the data through an auditing, repetitious process to ensure accuracy of
the data input, which included the utilization of the Qualtrics platform for dataset
examination. Kanji (2006) explained tests are not to be designed to gain an approval or
disapproval of hypotheses, but to show the hypotheses being tested is “untenable as it
leads to an unsatisfactorily small probability (Kanji, 2006, p. 2).” Expert mentoring
through Walden University, in the quantitative process, was established and served as an
audit element in helping to ensure reliability and validity throughout the quantitative
process. The following provides the research questions and hypotheses for the study.
RQ1: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for one international
law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector entities?
H01: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for one
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector
individuals?
H11: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for one
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector
individuals?
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RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for the penalties of
criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between public and private
sector individuals?
H02: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for the
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between
public and private sector individuals?
H12: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for the
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between
public and private sector individuals?
RQ3: Is there a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the
extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs modification of
stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector individuals?
H03: There is no difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector
individuals?
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H13: There is a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector
individuals?
The appropriate calculated alpha, power, and effect size was determined, as well a
calculated minimum sample size, prior to proceeding with running the statistical tests.
The nominal, dichotomous and ratio scale survey outcomes were coded using the most
current Qualtrics Stats iQ software database. The coded survey results were statistically
tested. Datasets were formulated from the coded independent, dependent, and groups
input for analysis in determining if the null hypotheses would be accepted or if the null
hypotheses would be rejected and the alternative hypotheses accepted, for each question
of the study in Chapter 4.
Chi-squared statistical analysis was run providing the statistical data needed for
the results of the study. Descriptive statistical analysis was conducted through data
observation and compared and contrasted through inferential statistical analysis. The
quantitative process provided for deductive data analysis, as well as provided a platform
for objectivity within the elemental processes of the study. Concerted efforts were taken
to help ensure there were no Type I or Type II errors in the testing procedures. Type I
errors involve rejecting a true hypothesis due to testing procedures and Type II errors
involve rejecting a false null hypothesis due to testing procedures. It has been stated by a
number of experts, in relation to a courtroom illustration, that making a Type I error is
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like an innocent defendant being convicted and making a Type II error is like letting a
criminal go free, by gaining an acquittal.
Threats to Validity
External validity was addressed through generalizability, where the threats may
include not examining the results of a study against the results of similar studies to show
how the findings apply to the answers of the research questions.
Ihantola and Kihn (2011) illustrated how an appropriate research design is critical
for the context of the study for providing a framework that mitigates the threats to
validity. Threats to internal validity can take place any time during the study, which
could include a lack of knowledge in relation to the study, where the logic presented is
contradictory to most of the research, or toward the end of the study when interpreting
and analyzing the data (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Ihantola and Kihn (2011) displayed,
through the studies of (Campbell & Stanely 163 in, Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p.87)
that issues with instrumentation can pose a threat to internal validity in the data collection
phase. Through the study of (Onwuegbuzie, 2003) Ihantola and Kihn (2011) showed
how bias can influence a study using technological tools and the way in which the
researcher chooses to interpret the findings according to their preferred techniques.
Steps were taken to help provide a holistic representative for capturing of the data,
in efforts to ensure the credibility of the findings, including procedural reliability, with
auditing expertise in the analysis of the statistical processes. (Inhantola & Kihn, 2011;
Öhlén, 2011). Statistical expertise was sought throughout the quantitative portion of the
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study to help ensure validity, credibility for the internal validity and transferability for the
external validity.
Questions that should be answered in relation to the assumptions of the
quantitative paradigm include looking at the study through lenses ontologically,
epistemologically, axiological, rhetorically, and methodologically (Creswell, 2014).
Creswell (2014) stated addressing the question of reality should be objectively examined,
the assumption that the researcher will be independent from the study, role assumption
should be unbiased and free of values, the language of the research should be formal and
quantitatively impersonal, and the methodological assumption of the study should ensure
the research encompasses a deductive process through generalizations, validity, and
reliability.
Ethical Procedures
Agreement documents for participants were formulated to comply with Internal
Review Board (IRB) standards for the treatment of participants in the study and were
included in the IRB application. Approvals and permissions were granted by the IRB
before the start of the proposed study. Ethical elements were addressed throughout every
stage of the study according to the official institutional IRB best standard practices and
protocols.
A formal email was sent electronically, through the associations and LinkedIn
networks on behalf of the researcher, describing the purpose of the study and why it is
relevant today with an anonymous survey link inviting individuals to be a voluntary
participant in the study. The survey link took all individual volunteers to the survey (see
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Appendix B). The survey was completely anonymous, including not capturing the IP
addresses of those responding to the survey. This was made possible by selecting this
option through the Qualtrics platform.
Privacy risks were minimal in that the survey respondents were completely
anonymous. By sending a survey link to various security organizations and asking for
the leadership of each organization to send an invitation on the behalf of the researcher to
participate in the study through a survey link, added to the anonymous nature of the
study, including the option of not capturing IP addresses, through the Qualtrics platform.
All survey responses were anonymous and voluntary, including the exclusion of IP
address identifiers, and presented minimal risks. The use of anonymity measures helped
ensure there were no potential conflicts of interest. Measures were taken to mask the
names of the various organizations that participated in the study according to the Walden
University IRB best practices.
Summary of Design and Methodology
The methodology chosen for this research study offered a framework for gaining
some insights from a multidisciplinary sample of individuals from the private and public
sectors that were familiar with cybersecurity related issues. This study generated insights
and knowledge for addressing the problem of criminal hacking globally and the potential
to help in future studies to show how policies and laws should be crafted in the future.
Through capturing the insights of individuals among the public and private sectors, and
their networking connections, on their attitudes for the need of an international law for
defining criminal hacking, the penalties associated with the act, and to what extent

86
criminal hacking should be punished a foundation has been established that can be built
upon. The insights gained helped distinguish if there is a need for one international law
addressing criminal hacking or if increased coordinative efforts toward addressing
criminal hacking from a singular nation’s multinational coordinative approach is needed.
Using the quantitative research design provided the generalizable scientific truth
of what perceptions are held among various disciplines for the protection of the cyber
realm, including those immersed in cybersecurity professions, law enforcement,
academia, the legislative realm, to name a few. Special attention was provided to the
threats to validity and how to mitigate those threats through the structured quantitative
research design. Concerted efforts were put forth to help ensure all the ethical procedures
involved for the participants in the study were covered using best standard practices of
the official institutional IRB. The deductive logic derived from the research questions
garnered insight to be synthesized for helping to propel future decision-making processes
nationally and internationally for the cybersecurity policy domain in addressing criminal
hacking. In chapter 4 the quantitative results are presented.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need
for one international law defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the
acts of criminal hacking and to what extent the crime should be penalized. The research
questions were designed to gain insight from public and private sector individuals on
their attitudes toward the need for an international law defining criminal hacking, the
penalties associated with the acts of criminal hacking, and to what extent criminal
hacking should be punished. The independent variables of the study included age group,
ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and
education; they were statistically measured with the dependent variables of the study and
the groups of public and private sector entities, showing correlations for the questions of
the study.
The following provides the central research question and the three questions for
the study: Is there a need for the definition of criminal hacking and the penalties
associated with the act to be addressed under one international law?
RQ1: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for one international
law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector entities?
H01: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for one
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international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector
individuals?
H11: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for one
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector
individuals?
RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for the penalties of
criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between public and private
sector individuals?
H02: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for the
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between
public and private sector individuals?
H12: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for the
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between
public and private sector individuals?
RQ3: Is there a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the
extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs modification of
stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector individuals?
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H03: There is no difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector
individuals?
H13: There is a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector
individuals?
Chapter 4 consists of the data collection details, descriptive statistics for the
survey questions, and the results of the study. The data collection details include the time
frame for data collection and the rates for recruitment and response, descriptive and
demographic characteristics of the sample, a description of how the sample related to the
population of interest, and challenges in the recruitment process. The results of the study
provide descriptive statistics that characterized the sample, an evaluation of statistical
assumptions, and statistical analyses findings with tables and figures illustrating the
results.
Data Collection
Walden University approved the study on July 12, 2019. The approval number for
this study is 07-16-19-0324940 and it expires on July 15, 2020. The survey data were
collected over a 5-month period through responses received from the memberships of a
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number of security organizations through an invitation sent on my behalf, LinkedIn
responses to the posted study on LinkedIn, and six responses through the Walden
University participant pool. The response rates were minimally steady throughout the
process, with some peaks in the response rates during the period likely because some
respondents reposted the survey request on their LinkedIn platforms. I assume the
majority of the responses were from security organizations because response rates peaked
when surveys were sent to those organizations’ memberships.
The sample included various demographic characteristics according to those
options provided in the survey questions, which included men and women; age group
representations from 18 years and above; educational backgrounds; and originating
ethnicities, which included Asian, African, American, Australian, Canadian, European
Union, Hispanic or Latino, India National, Middle Eastern, Russian, and the option of
other. Additionally, the sample included employment in public or private sector; critical
infrastructure most affiliated with, which included chemical sector, commercial facilities
sector, communications sector, critical manufacturing sector, dams sector, defense
industrial base sector, education sector, emergency services sector, energy sector,
financial services sector, food and agriculture sector, government facilities sector,
healthcare and public health sector, information technology sector, nuclear reactors
materials and waste sector, transportation systems sector, water and wastewater systems
sector, and the option of not being affiliated with any of the infrastructures provided
above. The options of technical hacking ability or no technical hacking ability were also
captured.
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Purposive total population nonprobability sampling was used for the study. The
sample studied represented a population of those affiliated with cybersecurity or security
in general to varying degrees. The population of interest represented only a portion of the
larger population, providing for a representative sample, given the scope of the study, to
gain the attitudes of individuals in the public and private sectors on international laws for
criminal hacking. The sample comprised of individual members of a number of security
organizations, LinkedIn professional networks, and a small sample of six respondents
from the Walden University participant pool. Sibona and Walczak (2012) showed how
using social networking sites for sample population, through nonprobability recruitment,
can help in exploring newer ideas pertaining to technologies and different cultures. It is
unknown if external validity or generalizability can be applied to all groups outside the
realm of cybersecurity or security in general. Hard to reach populations, such as the
criminal hacking realm, may have provided attitudes different from those represented in
this study.
The survey was administered according to the method planned for the sample
population, which included requests from security-related organizations to send out a
request to their membership on my behalf and LinkedIn networks comprising of those
familiar with security. Several organizations accepted the invitation to disseminate the
survey, and a few declined due to policies in place to only disseminate the organization’s
proprietary surveys to members. Although the length of time to gain a sizable number of
respondents was a challenge, the survey was open for 5 months and captured 228
responses.
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Challenges in gaining survey respondents could be due to the reasons some
security professionals tend to not participate in surveys or questionnaires. According to a
study on privacy, Heikkila (2009) illustrated 30 responses to her open ended follow up
question on why so few respond to security related questionnaires. The following is a list
of several of the responses (Heikkila, 2009, p. 91, Table 5):
•

“Because we don’t know who will have access to identifying information

from the survey and we don’t want to advertise our vulnerabilities.”
•

“People get asked to fill out surveys every day.”

•

“Not enough time to respond to surveys.”

•

“Fear that the information will be used against them. Embarrassment.

Ignorance on the subject. Many do not understand security and assume someone is taking
care of it.”
Results
The descriptive statistics that characterized the sample for the study enabled for a
clear picture to be gained from all the initial data inputs. The following tables provide
the demographics of the respondents in relation to employment sector affiliation (Table
1) and for each of the ten individual survey questions answered (Tables 2-11).
The following provides an example for reading the demographics table (Table 1).
Of the nongovernmental organization group, 0.0% are 18 to 29 years of age, 18.8% are
30 to 39 years of age, 31.3% are 40 to 49 years of age, 31.3% are 50 to 50 years of age,
and 18.8% are 60 years of age and above, which totals 100% for the number of
respondents that chose the nongovernmental organization as their employment sector.
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Table 1
Frequency Counts on the Demographics of Respondents in Relation to the Groups of the
Study: Employment Sector Affiliation, N = 226
Demographics
Age group N = 226
18–29 years
30–39 years
40–49 years
50–59 years
60 years and above
Ethnicity N = 226
African
American
Asian
Canadian
EU
Hispanic
India National
Middle Eastern
Other
Gender N = 225
Female
Male
Infrastructure affiliation N = 225
Chemical
Commercial facilities
Communications
Critical manufacturing
Defense industrial base
Education
Emergency services
Energy
Financial services
Food and agriculture
Government facilities
Healthcare and public health
Information and technologies
Transportation
Other
Technical hacking ability N = 224
Yes
No
Education N = 225
Diploma or equivalent
Trade/technical training or college degree
Master’s degree or higher

Nongovernmental
organization

Private
sector

Public
sector

Retired

Unable
to work

0.0
18.8
31.3
31.3
18.8

5.2
16.4
29.1
35.8
13.4

0.0
22.1
36.8
27.9
13.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
40.0
60.0

0.0
33.3
33.3
33.3
0.0

12.5
43.8
6.3
0.0
6.3
12.5
0.0
12.5
6.3

2.2
64.2
4.5
1.5
19.4
0.7
0.7
0.7
6.0

4.4
67.6
0.0
2.9
16.2
1.5
1.5
2.9
2.9

0.0
40.0
0.0
0.0
40.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20.0

0.0
66.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
33.3

25.0
75.0

24.6
75.4

23.9
76.1

20.0
80.0

100.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
31.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.3
25.0
18.8
0.0
18.8

1.5
3.7
0.7
5.2
2.2
7.5
0.7
3.7
11.2
3.0
0.0
9.0
39.6
2.2
9.7

0.0
0.0
2.9
0.0
1.5
20.6
4.4
1.5
2.9
0.0
14.7
14.7
29.4
0.0
7.4

0.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
20.0
0.0
20.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

50.0
50.0

47.8
52.2

47.8
52.2

25.0
75.0

0.0
100.0

6.3
37.5
56.3

4.5
53.4
42.1

1.5
52.9
45.6

0.0
60.0
40.0

0.0
66.7
33.3

Note. N = Total respondents for each demographic category.
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For Survey Q1 (see Appendix B) there were 226 respondents who chose to answer the
question out of 228 total survey responses, and two who chose not to answer the question
on age group. Of the 226 responses, 7 (3.1 %) responded in the 18-29 age bracket, 41
(18.1%) responded in the 30-39 age bracket, 70 (31%) responded in the 40 – 49 age
bracket, 75 (33.2%) responded in the 50-59 age bracket, and 33 (14.6%) responded in the
60 years and above age bracket. The table shows the majority of the respondents fall
within the 40 to 59 age bracket (Table 2).
Table 2
Frequency Counts for Independent Ratio Scale Variable: Age Group
Age group
18 to 29 years
30 to 39 years
40 to 49 years
50 to 59 years
60 years and
above
Note. N = 226.

n
7
41
70
75
33

%
3.1
18.1
31.0
33.2
14.6

% of Data: confidence interval
1.9 to 4.9
15.1 to 21.7
27.2 to 35.0
29.3 to 37.3
11.8 to 17.9

For Survey Q2 (see Appendix B) there were 226 respondents who chose to answer
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and two that chose not to answer the
question on ethnicity. Of the 226 responses, 8 (3.5 %) responded to African descent, 143
(63.3%) responded to American descent, 7 (3.1%) responded to Asian descent, 4 (1.8%)
responded to Canadian descent, 40 (17.7%) responded to European Union descent, 4
(1.8%) responded to Hispanic or Latino descent, 2 (0.88%) responded to India National
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descent, 5 (2.2%) responded to Middle Eastern descent, and 13 (5.8%) responded to
other. The table shows the majority of respondents are from American descent (Table 3).
Table 3
Frequency Counts for Independent Nominal Variable: Ethnicity
Ethnicity

n

%

African
American
Asian
Canadian
EU
Hispanic
India National
Middle Eastern
Other

8
143
7
4
40
4
2
5
13

3.5
63.3
3.1
1.8
17.7
1.8
0.88
2.2
5.8

% of Data:
confidence interval
2.3 to 5.5
59.1 to 67.3
1.9 to 4.9
0.9 to 3.3
14.7 to 21.2
0.9 to 3.3
0.4 to 2.1
1.3 to 3.9
4.1 to 8.1

Note. N = 226.
For Survey Q3 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents who chose to answer
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and three that chose not to answer the
question on gender. Of the 225 responses, 168 (74.7 %) responded to being male and 57
(25.3%) responded to being female. The table shows nearly 3/4 of the survey
respondents were male (Table 4).
Table 4
Frequency Counts for Independent Dichotomous Variable: Gender
Gender

n

%

Male
Female
Note. N = 225

168
57

74.7
25.3

% of Data:
Confidence Interval
70.8 to 78.2
21.8 to 29.2
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For Survey Q4 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents who chose to answer
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and three that chose not to answer the
question on infrastructure affiliation. Of the 225 responses, 2 (0.88 %) responded being
affiliated with the chemical sector, 6 (2.7%) responded to being affiliated with the
commercial facilities sector, 3 (1.3%) responded to being affiliated with the
communications sector, 7 (3.1%) responded to being affiliated with the critical
manufacturing sector, 4 (1.8%) responded to being affiliated with defense industrial base
sector, 30 (13.3%) responded to being affiliated with the education sector, 4 (1.8%)
responded to being affiliated with the emergency services sector, 6 (2.7%) responded to
being affiliated with the energy sector, 17 (7.5%) responded to being affiliated with the
financial services sector, 4 (1.8%) responded to being affiliated with the food and
agriculture sector, 11 (4.9%) responded to being affiliated with the government facilities
sector, 27 (11.9%) responded to being affiliated with the healthcare and public health
sector, 77 (34.1%) responded to being affiliated with the information technology sector, 3
(1.3%) responded to being a part of the transportation sector, and 25 (11.1%) responded
to other, or not being affiliated with any of the infrastructure sectors provided (Table 5).
Table 5
Frequency Counts for Independent Nominal Variable: Infrastructure Sector Affiliation
Infrastructure sector
affiliation
Chemical
Commercial facilities
Communications
Critical manufacturing
Defense industrial base

n

%

2
6
3
7
4

0.88
2.7
1.3
3.1
1.8

% of Data:
confidence interval
0.4 to 2.1
1.6 to 4.4
0.6 to 2.7
1.9 to4.9
0.9 to 3.3
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Education
Emergency services
Energy
Financial services
Food and agriculture
Government facilities
Healthcare and public
health
Information and
technologies
Transportation
Other
Note. N = 225

30
4
6
17
4
11
27

13.3
1.8
2.7
7.5
1.8
4.9
11.9

10.6 to 16.4
0.9 to 3.3
1.6 to 4.4
5.6 to 10.1
0.9 to 3.3
3.3 to 7.0
9.5 to 15.0

77

34.1

30.2 to 38.2

3
25

1.3
11.1

0.6 to 2.7
8.7 to 14.0

For Survey Q5 (see Appendix B) there were 224 respondents who chose to answer
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and four chose not to answer the question
on technical hacking ability. Of the 224 responses, 105 (46.9 %) responded to having
technical hacking ability, and 119 (53.1%) responded to not having technical hacking
skills. The table shows nearly an even distribution of technical hacking ability and no
technical hacking skills among the survey respondents (Table 6).
Table 6
Frequency Counts for Independent Dichotomous Variable: Technical Hacking Ability
Technical
hacking ability

n

%

Technical
hacking ability
No technical
hacking skills
Note. N = 224.

105

46.9

% of Data:
confidence
interval
42.6 to 51.2

119

53.1

48.8 to 57.4
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For Survey Q6 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents that chose to answer
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and two who chose not to answer the
question on education. Of the 225 responses, 8 (3.6 %) responded to having a high
school graduate degree or equivalent, 99 (44.0%) responded to having a Master’s degree
or higher, and 118 (52.4%) responded to having trade or technical training or a college
degree. The table shows 96.4 % of the respondents achieved education outside of the high
school graduate level (Table 7).
Table 7
Frequency Counts for Independent Nominal Variable: Education
Education
High school
graduate or
equivalent
Master’s degree
or higher
Trade/technical
training or a
college degree
Note. N = 225.

n

%

8

3.6

% of Data:
confidence
interval
2.3 to 5.5

99

44.0

39.8 to 48.3

118

52.4

48.2 to 56.7

For Survey Q7 (see Appendix B), 226 respondents chose to answer the question
out of 228 total survey responses, and two chose not to answer the question on
employment sector. Of the 226 responses, 134 (59.3 %) responded to being a part of the
private sector, 68 (30.1%) responded to being a part of the public sector, 16 (7.1%)
responded to having being a part of a non-governmental organization, 5 (2.2%)
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responded to being retired, and 3 (1.3%) responded to being unable to work. Nearly 2/3
of the respondents are from the private sector (Table 8).
Table 8
Frequency Counts for Groups Nominal Variable: Employment Sector
Employment
sector
Private sector
Public sector
NGO
Retired
Unable to work
Note. N = 226.

n

%

134
68
16
5
3

59.3
30.1
7.1
2.2
1.3

% of Data:
confidence
interval
55.1 to 63.4
26.3 to 34.1
5.2 to 9.6
1.3 to 3.9
0.6 to 2.7

For Survey Q8 (see Appendix B) there were 224 respondents who chose to answer
the question, out of 228 total survey responses, and four chose not to answer the question.
Research Question 1: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate
your attitude toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking (See
Appendix B, Survey Q8)?
Of the 224 responses, 104 (46.4 %) responded strongly agree, 80 (35.7%)
responded somewhat agree, 14 (6.3%) responded to neither agree nor disagree, 14 (6.3%)
responded to somewhat disagree, 12 (5.4%) responded to strongly disagree (Table 9).
Table 9
Frequency Counts for Dependent Variable: Research Question 1, Likert Scale
RQ1

n

%

Strongly agree

104

46.4

% of Data:
confidence
interval
42.2 to 50.7

100
Somewhat agree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Note. N = 224.

80
14

35.7
6.3

31.7 to 39.9
4.5 to 8.7

14

6.3

4.5 to 8.7

12

5.4

3.7 to 7.6

Numerical coding of RQ1 in Stats iQ allowed for the following descriptive
statistics for the dependent variable Likert scale evaluation of Survey Q8 (Table 10).
Table 10
Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 8 - Likert Scale
Sample
size

Medium

Average

224

2.0

1.88

Confidence Standard
interval of deviation
average
1.74 – 2.03 1.12

Min

Max

Sum

1.0

5.0

422

For Survey Q9 (see Appendix B) there were 226 respondents who chose to answer
the question, out of 228 total survey responses, and two chose not to answer the question.
Research Question 2: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate
your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under
one international law (see Appendix B, Survey Q9)?
Of the 226 responses, 102 (45.1 %) responded strongly agree, 80 (35.4%)
responded somewhat agree, 14 (6.2%) responded to neither agree nor disagree, 15 (6.6%)
responded to somewhat disagree, 15 (6.6%) responded to strongly disagree (Table 11).
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Table 11
Frequency Counts for Dependent Variable: Research Question 2 - Likert Scale
RQ2

n

Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Note. N = 226.

%

102
80
14

45.1
35.4
6.2

% of Data:
confidence
interval
40.9 to 49.4
31.4 to 39.6
4.4 to 8.6

15

6.6

4.8 to 9.1

15

6.6

4.8 to 9.1

Numerical coding of RQ1 in Stats iQ allowed for the following descriptive
statistics for the dependent variable Likert scale evaluation of Survey Q9 (Table 12).
Table 12
Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 9 - Likert Scale
Sample
size

Medium

Average

226

2.0

1.94

Confidence Standard
interval of deviation
average
1.79 – 2.10 1.17

Min

Max

Sum

1.0

5.0

439

For Survey Q10 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents who chose to
answer the question out of 228 total survey responses, and three chose not to answer the
question.
Research Question 3: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate
your inclination on the extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it would
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be implemented globally? Use the example of the United States Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA) penalties chart (see Appendix B, Survey Q10).
Of the 225 responses, 4 (1.8 %) responded no penalties, 7 (3.1%) responded
minimal to less than moderate penalties, 61 (27.1%) responded to moderate penalties, 98
(43.6%) responded to more than moderate penalties, and 55 (24.4%) responded to the
harshest of penalties (Table 13).
Table 13
Frequency Counts for Dependent Variable: Research Question 3 - Likert Scale
RQ3
No Penalties
Minimal to Less
Than Moderate
Penalties
Moderate
Penalties
More Than
Moderate
Penalties
Harshest of
Penalties
Note. N = 225.

n

%

4
7

1.8
3.1

% of Data:
confidence
interval
.9 to 3.3
1.9 to 5.0

61

27.1

23.5 to 31.1

98

43.6

39.4 to 47

55

24.4

21.0 to 28.3

Numerical coding of RQ1 in Stats iQ allowed for the following descriptive
statistics for the dependent variables of survey questions 10 through 12 Likert scale
evaluations (Tables 14-16).
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Table 14
Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 8 - Likert Scale
Sample
Size

Medium Average Confidence Standard
Min Max
Sum
Interval of Deviation
Average
224
2.0
1.88
1.74 – 2.03 1.12
1.0
5.0
422
Note. Code 1 = strongly agree. Code 2 = somewhat agree. Code 3 = neither agree nor
disagree. Code 4 = disagree. Code 5 = strongly disagree.
Table 15
Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 9 - Likert Scale
Sample
Size

Medium Average Confidence Standard
Min Max
Sum
interval of deviation
average
226
2.0
1.94
1.79 – 2.10 1.17
1.0
5.0
439
Note. Code 1 = strongly agree. Code 2 = somewhat agree. Code 3 = neither agree nor
disagree. Code 4 = disagree. Code 5 = strongly disagree.
Table 16
Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 10 - Likert Scale
Sample Medium Average Confidence Standard
Min
Max
Sum
Size
Interval of Deviation
Average
225
4.0
3.86
3.74 – 3.97 0.89
1.0
5.0
868
Note. Code 1 = no penalties. Code 2 = minimal to less than moderate penalties. Code 3 =
moderate penalties. Code 4 = more than moderate penalties. Code 5 = harshest of
penalties.
The statistical platform used for the study was Stats iQ, a part of the Qualtrics
platform. There are four options in Stats iQ for data analysis, which include describe,
relate, regression, and pivot table. The artificial intelligence (AI) of the Stats iQ platform
automatically defaults to the test with the least assumptions, given there is an option
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The Stats iQ platform uses one-way ANOVA (Welch’s F test) to
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show relationships between two variables and Games-Howell tests to show if there are
higher values in pairs of groups or others (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). In ranked correlation
Stats iQ uses Spearman’s Rho when assumptions are violated by implementing ranktransformation (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). “Rank transformation is a well-established
method for protecting against assumption violation (a “nonparametric” method), and the
rank transformation from Pearson to Spearman is the most common” (Conover and Iman,
1981, as cited by Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Pearson’s r is used for Likert scale analysis, in
that they are measured as they are continuous instead of ordinal, which is commonly
done in the social science realm (Qualtrics, Provo, UT).
Chi-square statistical analysis was used on the respondent data to find correlations
among the data points, which included the aforementioned statistical tests with the AI
Stats iQ platform. The statistical assumption for analysis using chi-square is “there has to
be at least five observations in each cell of the 2X2 table associated with the analysis
(scalelive.com).” A Fisher’s Exact Test is used when the aforementioned is not fulfilled
(scalelive.com). The primary inference with Chi-square is 95% confidence level and
unadjusted odds ratio (Qualtrics, Provo, UT).
Summary of Survey Q8: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you
rate your attitude toward the need for one international law for defining criminal
hacking?
The results of the chi-square analysis revealed a non-significant association
relationship between Survey Q7: Employment Sector - Please specify the employment
sector you are most closely aligned with, and RQ1, which is Survey Q8: On a scale from
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1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your attitude toward the need for one
international law for defining criminal hacking?
The analysis also showed no statistical significance with the independent
variables of age group, ethnicity, gender, hacking ability, and education. Additionally,
the relationship between Survey Q7: Employment Sector and Survey Q4: Infrastructure
Sector showed there is a strong statistically significant relationship (Table 17). The
following cells were statistically significant (Table 18):
•

Of those that responded in the Private Sector group, 5.2% are in the

Critical Manufacturing Sector group. The 95% Confidence interval is 2.6% to 10.4%.
•

Of those that responded in the Public Sector group, 20.6% are in the

Education Sector group. The 95% confidence interval is 12.7% to 31.6%.
•

Of those that responded in the Non-Governmental Organization group,

31.3% are in the Education Sector group. The 95% Confidence interval is 14.2% to
55.6%.
•

Of those that responded in the Private Sector group, 36.6% are in the

Information Technology group. The 95% Confidence interval is 31.7 to 48.0%.
Table 17
Chi-square Test on Employment Sector (Survey Q7) and Infrastructure Affiliation
(Survey Q4)
Basic
Statistical
significance
(P-Value)
Effect size

Advanced

Very
0.000561
clearly
significant
Large
0.32753
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(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 226.
Table 18
The Relationship between Employment Sector and Infrastructure Sector Affiliation
Infrastructure sector
affiliation
Chemical
Commercial facilities
Communications
Critical manufacturing
Defense industrial base
Education
Emergency services
Energy
Financial services
Food and agriculture
Government facilities
Healthcare and public
health
Information and
technologies
Transportation
Other

Nongovernmental
organization
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
31.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
6.3%
25.0%

Private
sector
1.5%
3.7%
0.75%
5.2%
2.2%
7.5%
0.75%
3.7%
11.2%
3.0%
0.0%
9.0%

Public
sector
0.0%
0.0%
2.9%
0.0%
1.5%
20.6%
4.4%
1.5%
2.9%
0.0%
14.7%
14.7%

Retired
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%

18.8%

39.6%

29.4%

20.0%

0.0%
18.8%

2.2%
9.7%

0.0%
7.4%

0.0%
20.0%

Using a 95% confidence level, the results of the chi-square analyses revealed no
significant associations between the groups of the study (Public Sector, Private Sector,
and Non-Governmental Organizations) and the independent and dependent variables of
age group, ethnicity, gender, hacking ability, education, and Survey Q8: On a scale from
1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your attitude toward the need for one
international law for defining criminal hacking? The chi-square statistical results: X² (16,
N = 224) = 18, p = .32. There is no statistically significant association between the groups
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of the employment sector and the dependent variable, RQ1 and Survey Q8 of the study;
therefore, I concluded the H01 cannot be rejected (Tables 19 & 20).
Table 19
Chi-square Test on Employment Sector (Survey Q7) and RQ1 (Survey Q8)
Statistical
significance
(P-Value)
Effect size
(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 224.

Basic
Not
significant
Small

Advanced
0.322249
0.32753

Table 20
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 18.0
Degrees of freedom 16
Summary of Survey Q9: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would
rate your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed
under one international law?
Using a 95% confidence level, the data analysis showed no statistically significant
relationship between Survey Q7: Employment Sector - Please specify the employment
sector you are most closely aligned with, and Survey Q9: On a scale from 1 to 5 please
indicate how you would rate your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal
hacking to be addressed under one international law?
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The analysis also showed no statistical significance among the groups of the study
and the independent variables of age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure affiliation,
hacking ability, education. The chi-square statistical results for the group of employment
sector and RQ2: X² (16, N = 226) = 12.6, p = .70. There is no statistically significant
association between the groups of the employment sector and dependent variable, RQ2
and Survey Q9 of the study; therefore, I concluded the H02 cannot be rejected for RQ2.
(Tables 21 & 22).
Table 21
Chi-square Test on Employment Sector (Survey Q7) and RQ2 (Survey Q9)
Basic

Advanced

Statistical
Not
0.703178
Significance Significant
(P-Value)
Small
0.117966
Effect size
(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 226.
Table 22
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 12.6
Degrees of freedom 16
Summary of Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would
rate your inclination on the extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it
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would be implemented globally? See the United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) penalties chart (see Appendix B)
Using a 95% confidence level, the data analysis showed no statistically significant
relationship between Q7: Employment Sector - Please specify the employment sector you
are most closely aligned with, and Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you
would rate your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be
addressed under one international law (Tables 23 & 24)?
The analysis also showed no statistical significance among the groups of the study
and the independent variables of age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure affiliation,
hacking ability, education. The chi-square statistical results for the group of employment
sector and RQ3: X² (16, N = 225) = 21.9, p = .147. There is no statistically significant
association between the groups of the employment sector and dependent variable, RQ3
and Survey Q10 of the study; therefore, I concluded the H03 cannot be rejected for RQ3.
Table 23
Chi-square Test on Employment Sector (Survey Q7) and RQ3 (Survey Q10)

Statistical
significance
(P-Value)

Basic

Advanced

Not
significant

0.147

Effect Size Small
(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 225.

0.156
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Table 24
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 21.9
Degrees of freedom 16
Interestingly, the data analyses provided additional statistical correlation among
the independent and dependent variables of the study showing varying degrees of
significant relationships from the respondent’s survey data. The following tables
provided the results of the chi-square analyses using a 95% confidence level.
There is a statistically significant relationship between Survey Q1: Age Group and
Survey Q8: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your attitude
toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking? The chi-square
statistical results for age group and Q8: X² (16, N = 224) = 28.1, p = .0308
The chi-square statistical analyses and a pivot table showing the descriptive
statistics are provided (Tables 25-27).
Table 25
Chi-square Test on Age Group (Survey Q1) and RQ1 (Survey Q8)
Basic
Statistical
Clearly
significance significant
(P-Value)
Medium
Effect size
(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 224.

Advanced
0.0308
0.177
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Table 26
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 28.1
Degrees of freedom 16
Table 27
Pivot Table for Age Group (Survey Q1) and RQ1 (Survey Q8)
Years of age Strongly
agree

Somewhat
agree

18 to 29
30 to 39
40 to 49
50 to 59
60 and up
Total

3.8%
26.3%
28.8%
30.0%
11.3%
0.100%

1.9%
10.6%
35.6%
33.7%
18.3%
0.100%

Neither
agree nor
disagree
0.0%
50.0%
28.6%
7.1%
14.3%
0.100%

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7.1%
7.1%
14.3%
57.1%
14.3%
0.100%

8.3%
8.3%
33.3%
41.7%
8.3%
0.100%

There is a strong statistically significant relationship between Survey Q4:
Infrastructure Sector Affiliation and Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate
how you would rate your inclination on the extent that criminal hacking should be
penalized, given it would be implemented globally? The chi-square statistical results for
infrastructure affiliation and RQ3: X² (56, N = 225) = 84.2, p = .00882
The chi-square statistical analyses and a pivot table showing the descriptive
statistics are provided (Tables 28-30).
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Table 28
Chi-square Test on Infrastructure Affiliation (Survey Q4) and RQ3 (Survey Q10)
Basic

Advanced

Statistical
Very
significance clearly
(P-Value)
significant
Effect size
Large
(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 225.

0.00882
0.306

Table 29
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 84.2
Degrees of freedom 56
Table 30
Pivot Table for Infrastructure Affiliation (Survey Q4) and RQ3 (Survey Q10)
Infrastructure
sector affiliation

Harshest
of
penalties

Chemical
Commercial
facilities
Communications
Critical
manufacturing
Defense
industrial base
Education
Emergency
services
Energy

1.8%
3.6%

More
than
moderate
penalties
1.0%
2.0%

Moderate
penalties

1.8%
3.6%

2.0%
1.0%

0.0%
6.6%

0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%

1.8%

0.0%

3.3%

0.0%

25.0%

7.3%
7.3%

20.4%
0.0%

4.9%
0.0%

42.9%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%

3.6%

3.1%

1.6%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%
1.6%

Minimal
to less
than
moderate
0.0%
14.3%

No
penalties
0.0%
0.0%
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Financial services 10.9%
Food and
1.8%
agriculture
Government
1.8%
facilities
Healthcare and
10.9%
public health
Information and
29.1%
technologies
0.0%
Transportation
14.5%
Other
Total
100.0%

5.1%
2.0%

6.6%
1.6%

0.0%
0.0%

50.0%
0.0%

9.2%

1.6%

0.0%

0.0%

8.2%

21.3%

0.0%

0.0%

33.7%

39.3%

42.9%

25.0%

1.0%
11.2%
100%

3.3%
8.2%
100%

0.0%
0.0%
100%

0.0%
0.0%
100%

There is a statistically significant relationship between Survey Q1: Age Group and
Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate your inclination
on the extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it would be implemented
globally? The chi-square statistical results for age group and RQ3: X² (16, N = 225) =
32.1, p = .00968
The chi-square statistical analysis and a pivot table showing the descriptive
statistics are provided (Tables 31-33).
Table 31
Chi-square Test on Age Group (Survey Q1) and RQ3 (Survey Q10)
Basic
Statistical
Very
significance clearly
(P-Value)
significant
Effect size
(Cramér’s
Medium
V)
Note. Sample Size 225.

Advanced
0.00968

0.189
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Table 32
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 32.1
Degrees of freedom 16
Table 33
Pivot Table for Age Group (Survey Q1) and RQ3 (Survey Q10)
Years of age Harshest of
penalties

More than
moderate
penalties

Moderate
penalties

18 to 29
30 to 39
40 to 49
50 to 59
60 and up
Total

4.1%
14.3%
33.7%
34.7%
13.3%
100.0%

4.9%
29.5%
29.5%
26.2%
9.8%
100.0%

0.0%
5.5%
30.9%
38.2%
25.5%
100.0%

Minimal to
less than
moderate
penalties
0.0%
57.1%
28.6%
14.3%
0.0%
100.0%

No penalties

0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
75.0%
0.0%
100.0%

There is a statistically significant relationship between Survey Q5: Technical
Hacking Ability and Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would
rate your inclination on the extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it
would be implemented globally? The chi-square statistical results for technical hacking
ability and RQ3: X² (4, N = 223) = 24.7, p = .0000583
The chi-square statistical analysis and a pivot table showing the descriptive
statistics are provided (Tables 34-36).
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Table 34
Chi-square Test on Technical Hacking Ability (Survey Q5) and RQ3 (Survey Q10)

Statistical
significance
(P-Value)

Basic

Advanced

Very
clearly
significant

0.0000583

Effect Size Medium
(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 223.

0.333

Table 35
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 24.7
Degrees of freedom 4
Table 36
Pivot Table for Hacking Ability (Survey Q5) and RQ3 (Survey Q10)
Technical
hacking
ability

Harshest of
penalties

Technical
20.8%
hacking
ability
No technical 79.2%
hacking
ability
Total
100.0%

More than
moderate
penalties

Moderate
penalties

No penalties

65.6%

Minimal to
less than
moderate
penalties
57.1%

48.0%
52.0%

34.4%

42.09%

25.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

75.0%
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There is a subtle but statistically significant relationship between Survey Q3:
Gender and Survey Q8: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your
attitude toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking? The
chi-square statistical results for the gender and RQ1: X² (4, N = 225) = 12.2, p = .0158
The chi-square statistical analysis and a pivot table showing the descriptive
statistics are provided (Tables 37-39).
Table 37
Chi-square Test on Gender (Survey Q3) and RQ1 (Survey Q8)

Statistical
significance
(P-Value)

Basic

Advanced

Very
clearly
significant

0.0158

Effect size
Small
(Cramér’s
V)
Note. Sample Size 225.

Table 38
Chi-squared Results
Chi square 12.2
Degrees of freedom 4

0.234
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Table 39
Pivot Table for Gender (Survey Q3) and RQ1 (Survey Q8)
Gender

Strongly
agree

Somewhat
agree

Female
Male
Total

34.6%
65.4%
100.0%

16.3%
83.8%
100.0%

Neither
agree nor
disagree
21.4%
78.6%
100.0%

Somewhat
disagree

Disagree

28.6%
71.4%
100.0%

0.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Summary
In this study I explored the relationships between the group of employment sector
individuals, independent variables of age, ethnicity, gender, critical infrastructure
affiliation, technical hacking ability, education level, and the dependent variables, which
included the attitudes toward an international law for defining criminal hacking, the
attitudes toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one
international law, and the attitudes toward the extent that criminal hacking should be
penalized, given it would be implemented globally.
The following research questions for the study were statistically analyzed,
revealing no significant association between the groups of employment sector individuals
and the independent and dependent variables of the study. RQ1: Do age groups,
ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education
predict the attitudes toward the need for one international law for defining criminal
hacking between public and private sector entities?, RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity,
gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education predict
the attitudes toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under
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one international law between public and private sector individuals?, and RQ3: Is there a
difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical
hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as
defined from the example in the study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties
between public and private sector individuals?
The analysis from the chi-square tests showed no significant differences in the
mean of the employment sector groups, which included public and private sector
individuals, and the mean of the independent and dependent variables of the study. The
null hypotheses for RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 were statistically tested using a 95% confidence
interval. Concerted efforts were taken to help ensure the correct inferences were gained
and there were no type I or type II errors. The assumptions for the hypotheses testing
included the level of measurement of the variables, the sampling method, the shape of the
population distribution, and the sample size.
Although, there were no statistical significance among the research questions for
the study, some statistical significance was found from analyzing the independent and
dependents variables of the study, without the group of employment sector as the primary
independent variable. The findings from these data analyses included: there is a
statistical significance in age group and the attitudes toward the need for one international
law for defining criminal hacking (RQ1), there is a statistical significance in age group
and the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the
study needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (RQ3), there is a statistical
significance in gender and the attitudes toward the need for one international law for
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defining criminal hacking (RQ1), there is a statistical significance in infrastructure
affiliation and the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the
example in the study (RQ3), and there is a statistical significance in hacking ability and
the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the
study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (RQ3).
Through the data analyses, these data demonstrated the need for an international
law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the crime, as well as
to what extent the crime should be penalized, according to what is put forth and described
in the United States CFAA, as an example for capturing respondent attitudes of lesser or
more strict penalties. The theoretical approach used in the study illustrated how role
theory and empathy have a connection in propelling effective policy employment for the
future of criminal hacking laws at the international level. Chapter 5 concludes the study
with interpretations of the findings, limitations, recommendations, and implications of the
study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need
for one international law defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the
act. The threat landscape in the virtual realm continues to escalate, leaving paths of
destruction. The privacy and security of individuals, businesses, and global communities
are suffering from the damages caused by criminal hacking.
I conducted this study hoping to find a relationship among the groups of the
employment sectors, which included public and private sector individuals, and their
attitudes on the need for an international law defining criminal hacking, attitudes toward
the need for penalties for criminal hacking under one international law, and attitudes
toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs
modification of stricter or lesser penalties. I hope this study will help propel solutions for
answering and addressing these questions.
Summary of Key Findings
There were no significant associations between the groups of employment sector
individuals and the independent and dependent variables of the study. Although there
were no significant findings for the precise research questions of the study, there were
findings of statistical significance found from analyzing the independent and dependent
variables. Without the group of employment sector as the primary independent variable,
a deeper dive into the relationships among the independent variables of age group,

121
infrastructure affiliation, gender, and hacking ability, and the dependent variables served
the questions of the study.
The findings from these data analyses included the following statistical
correlations. There is a statistical significance in age group and attitudes toward the need
for one international law defining criminal hacking (Tables 22 and 23). There is a
statistical significance in age group and attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as
defined in the study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (Tables 26 and 27).
There is a subtle, but statistical, significance in gender and the attitudes toward the need
for one international law defining criminal hacking (Tables 30 and 31). There is a strong
statistical significance in infrastructure affiliation and attitudes toward the extent criminal
hacking, as defined in the study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (Tables
24 and 25). Lastly, there is a statistical significance in hacking ability and attitudes
toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined in the study, needs modification of stricter
or lesser penalties (Tables 28 and 29).
In retrospect, my study could have focused on fewer variables and eliminated
employment sector as the overarching variable to be statistically analyzed among the
independent and dependent variables. If the focus of the independent variable of groups,
which included public sector and private sector individuals, was eliminated and the study
proceeded with the remaining variables, the study would have shown statistically
significant results and the null hypotheses for RQ3 would have been rejected and the
alternative hypothesis accepted, showing a difference among age groups, ethnicity,
gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on

122
attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study,
needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties. The preceding alternative hypothesis
excluded the groups of public and private sector individuals, as depicted in the study, as
an example.
Interpretation of the Findings
The findings of my study align with the need to help curtail the damage being
done on a global scale from activities of criminal hacking through the overwhelming
responses toward the need to have more than moderate penalties for criminal hacking
(Table 13). Bartholomae (2017) illustrated, through a network model comprising of a
cloud service provider, consumers of the cloud service provider, and one who penetrates
the cloud network to gain information, that global policy is needed to deter hacking by
imposing higher fines. This can be applicable to the general consensus of the study for
the penalties associated with criminal hacking. The survey responses, weighing more
toward the attitude that the penalties for criminal hacking should be more than what are
presently in place in the United States. The international community has made some
gains since the 2001 treaty on cybercrime was implemented, although much more work is
needed (Bartholomae, 2017).
Similarly, Visher and Weisburd (1998) expounded on how there needs to be
tailored approaches for crime prevention strategies to help ensure recidivism rates
decrease and are potentially alleviated. These approaches should involve efforts among
stakeholders in establishing and implementing unique programs with precise elements for
addressing specific types of crimes (Visher & Weisburd, 1998). By addressing criminal
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hacking through a government role approach, while embodying empathy in the processes,
governments, businesses, and organizations, as well as individuals, globally can reap the
benefits of a stable global cyber realm. With leaders worldwide taking a holistic
approach in using a lens that captures the threat landscape, privacy and security, and
effective policies and laws, international legislative bodies can move forward collectively
in helping to decrease criminal hacking levels.
The findings in this study confirm a need for policies to be addressed at the
international level (Tables 9 and 11). Trotta (2017) elucidated the need for expert
technocrat knowledge and the knowledge of the citizenry to help enhance policy efforts.
The opinions of multidisciplinary experts and the population as a whole would greatly
benefit from efforts being put forth in addressing criminal hacking policy solutions;
everybody is being affected by the devastations created globally from criminal hacking.
If these additional objectives were adopted as best practices and promulgated within the
legislative realm around the world, there could be an increase in the rate at which critical
policy issues are addressed in general.
Limitations of the Study
There were some limitations and a delimitation to my study. One limitation
included a lack of previous studies in the research topic area, which made it harder to find
studies that would provide meaning to the concepts of my study. Although the virtual
realm has existed for decades, there have been few studies on the policy issues involving
criminal hacking. This element presented challenges for building on the research of other
studies involving the concepts, in relation to criminal hacking, the threat landscape,
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security, privacy, policy, and laws, which were addressed in Chapter 2. Other limitations
of the study, which are common for many research studies, were time and monetary
resources. With unlimited time and money, the aims, goals, and outcomes of the study
would have produced additional insights through the potential of a larger global sample
size, providing additional data to be analyzed.
The data collection method could have been improved with more experience in
collecting primary data. Experience in data collection may have helped in alleviating the
additional amount of time involved in conducting the research study. Additionally,
experience in data collection may have helped me bring in a larger sample size in a
shorter amount of time, which would have potentially generated additional correlations or
results for the study.
A delimitation of my study can be seen through too narrow of a research aim for
the groups of the study, involving employment sectors, as the main focus of the study in
relation to the independent variables and the dependent variables. This more narrowed
approach eliminated the opportunity to gain statistical significance in other areas between
the independent and dependent variables of the study. Fewer independent variables,
while broadening the focus of the study in eliminating the primary independent variable
of employment sector groups, would have allowed for the main focus of the study to be
on examining the relationships between fewer independent variables and the dependent
variables of the study, providing for additional correlations for the questions of the study.
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Recommendations and Future Studies
Criminal hacking touches numerous entities worldwide from individuals,
companies, organizations, and governments, to name a few. A theme I uncovered,
throughout the research process, is how prevalent hacking is internationally. There has
been a rise in information warfare, stated Lei (2019), which involves gaining an
advantage from the use of information. The use of information to gain an advantage has
been taking place globally, with a few countries being noted on the news front as being
more active in this area. The U.S. Justice Department indicted four Chinese hackers in
the Equifax breach in February 2020 (Dufner, 2020). It is unknown if there will be any
resolutions from these indictments. Marks (2019) suggested that hackers of North Korea
have been using information warfare technics, although their acts are seen by many as
acts of espionage, rather than criminal hacking acts. With no clear definition for criminal
hacking, gray areas pertaining to criminal hacking and information warfare continue to be
an issue in the policy realm, with a great deal of work yet to be done in establishing a
framework that clearly addresses criminal hacking holistically.
Scharf and Taylor (2017) showed how the crime of piracy, an international crime
over two hundred years old, could offer some new perspectives on addressing similar
issues in modern day societies. It has been suggested we look at the international laws of
piracy for building a coordinative framework for addressing cybersecurity related issues
in relation to computer intrusions (Lei, 2019; Shackelford, 2017a). Scholars could study
the viability of using an existing international framework, under international law and
piracy, to address the criminal acts of hacking in future studies.
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Additional insights could be gained from the hacking culture today, toward policy
solutions in the criminal hacking realm, through future scholarly studies anonymously
involving todays, more transparent, technological hackers and whether age group,
ethnicity, and gender plays a part in differentiating opinions. Hiltner, a reporter for the
Surfacing column (September 2018), showed how some anonymity and privacy
perceptions are moving in a different direction from what was once considered to be the
norm of only using aliases, which can be seen through interactions from hacker
conferences, such as the annual hacking conference held in Las Vegas, Nevada, Defcon.
Hiltner illustrated how the pressures involving demands by the private and public sectors
for experts in the cybersecurity field and bug bounty programs, propelled by professional
entities and the gamification arena, have shown a present day need for various aspects of
the hacking culture (Hiltner, 2018).
Similar to my study, I recommend future studies, which could offer additional
insights for addressing policy issues in the criminal hacking realm and if there should be
policies at the international level, solely studying the attitudes of technological hackers.
These future studies, addressing the attitudes of those with technological hacking skills
and if their attitudes reveal there is a need for international laws addressing criminal
hacking, could provide policy solutions that have not yet been considered. The
information gained by these future studies could be used by international legislative
bodies for helping to determine the scope of criminal hacking laws on an international
level.
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Political culture in relation to an international framework addressing criminal
hacking could pose as a future study involving a sample of the legislative population in a
number of countries. The study could offer a great deal of insight as to how international
communities should move forward in holistically addressing criminal hacking and if one
international law is feasible, providing the vast differences in political cultures around the
world. This study could also be used in concert with meta-analysis for studying various
populations around the world and their attitudes on an international framework for
criminal hacking. Singh (2007) showed how meta-analysis is used to find patterns from
multiple studies, using a number of statistical tests, to help in solving research problems.
Scholars could gain additional insights from future studies involving global
government leaders on if there is a need for an international law for defining criminal
hacking, policies associated with criminal hacking, and what penalties should be
attributed for committing the crime. The results of this future study potentially could add
to the findings of my study and other studies, in the criminal hacking realm, for
determining if there are additional outliers that should be considered for the development
of international laws and policies, in general, for addressing criminal hacking policies
among international communities. A multidisciplinary approach in gaining insights from
future studies for international policy development in the criminal hacking realm should
help escalate potential policy solutions for addressing universal criminal hacking policy
issues.
Finally, a future study, limited to a few independent variables, without the
inclusion of employment sector groups, as my study included, could be employed so data
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from a larger global sample could be analyzed to see if there is a significance among the
variables of the study and the attitudes toward the penalties of criminal hacking and
international laws. Promoting future scholarly studies in the realm of criminal hacking
and policy development will help ensure there are ample amounts of data to sift through
in efforts to find beneficial correlations that could have a positive impact on the trajectory
of future laws for criminal hacking.
Implications
There are some implications for positive social change in the policy realm, which
would ultimately have an impact on every member of the global society, as a whole.
Callahan et al. (2012) illustrated a multifaceted framework that Walden University has
used for a number of social change initiatives stemming from the Walden University
community of alumni, faculty members, and students. The framework included a number
of features that potentially could be webbed together to provide a holistic approach to
addressing positive social change in a number of areas among our global communities.
The framework consists of eight features that involve collaboration, advocacy, practice,
civic engagement, humane ethics, systematic thinking, scholarship, and reflection
(Callahan et al., 2012).
The elemental framework Callahan et al. (2012) depicted would work very well in
promoting future studies in the realm of cybersecurity and ultimately providing for a
holistic policy development approach for defining criminal hacking internationally, and
the penalties that should be associated with the crime. The pieces of collaboration and
advocacy (Callahan et al., 2012) are instrumental, in that collaboration is needed at all
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levels of government for addressing criminal hacking and advocacy is needed in attempts
to propel the policy initiatives. Scholarship, systematic thinking, civic engagement, and
practice, additional pieces of the Callahan et al. (2012) framework, culminate into a
practitioner’s model that could be used to further the initiatives already in place in the
cybersecurity realm, for holistically using a team approach that embodies the great minds
of today for actively solving the modern-day issues of criminal hacking and effective
policy implementation. Finally, the key elements described, as well as the additional
elements of humane ethics and reflection, from the features of the Callahan et al. (2012)
framework, are needed to fully capture a holistic approach for addressing the needs of
humanity in the ever evolving threat landscape of criminal hacking, including the culture
that brings these criminal acts to fruition.
Building a framework consisting of agreements, rules, and laws among
international bodies is paramount in protecting societies and today and in the future from
the adverse and damaging effects of criminal hacking. Concerted efforts among technical
experts, including the hacking community, and the legislative realm will help propel
policy solutions for criminal hacking. An awareness approach, as to the hazards of
criminal hacking, could bring forth even more concerted efforts on a multidisciplinary
plane for finding answers to the policy issues we face today. Dissuading the criminal
hacking culture could pose as an additional approach in moving forward toward a policy
solution that captures the best interests of the entire global population.
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Conclusion
In summary, the examination of the attitudes of individuals, across the public and
private employment sectors, provided a general consensus, according to 82 percent of
survey respondents, on the need for an international law for defining criminal hacking,
the need for an international law for criminal hacking, according to 80 percent of survey
respondents, and addressing the penalties for criminal hacking at a standard that would be
more intense than what is put forth in the United States CFAA, according to 68 percent of
survey respondents. The deficiencies in clear policies being addressed across
multinational jurisdictions has enabled for lines to be blurred in what is deemed as
criminal hacking, the true origins of the intrusions, and a codification for bringing those
responsible for the economically and culturally crippling acts of criminal hacking. An
expansion of concerted efforts among multidisciplinary experts in the fields of the threat
landscape of the cyber realm, security and privacy, policy and law, and the hacking
culture, as a whole, may help contribute to effective policy solutions for addressing the
major dilemma we are facing involving the harmful trickling effects of criminal hacking.
Present day global entities and the future support of humankind depends on an effective
approach for curtailing the nefarious acts and disastrous effects of criminal hacking
worldwide.
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Appendix A: Alignment Table for Variables of the Study
IV1:
IV2:
IV3:
IV4:
IV5:
IV6:
Group:
Age
Ethnicity Gender Infrastructure Technical Education Public
Group
Affiliation
Hacking
Sector
Ability
DV1:
Attitudes
towards the
need for one
international
law for
defining
criminal
hacking
DV2:
Attitudes
towards the
need for the
penalties of
criminal
hacking to
be addressed
under one
international
law
DV3:
Attitudes
towards the
extent that
criminal
hacking
should be
penalized,
given it
would be
implemented
globally

Group:
Private
Sector
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Appendix B: Survey
This virtually disseminated survey is anonymous and voluntary and all
information provided will be used to fulfill the requirements for a research study
dissertation involving an examination of attitudes towards international standards for
criminal hacking. All answers are anonymous, including not capturing any IP addresses
through the survey platform. One must be 18 years or older to participate in the survey.
Around the world there are a number of statements defining computer intrusions,
or criminal hacking. Definitions include variations of some or all of the following:
intentionally accessing a protected device without authorization or exceeding authorized
access. There are also different standards, among various nations, that have been used for
addressing the penalties for criminal hacking. This study will examine attitudes on
whether there is a need for one international law that clearly defines criminal hacking and
the penalties associated with the act.
1 – Age Group
Please select which age bracket you are in.
o 18 to 29 years of age
o 30 to 39 years of age
o 40 to 49 years of age
o 50 to 59 years of age
o 60 years of age and above
2 – Ethnicity
Please specify the ethnic origin you most closely align with.
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o Asian descent
o African descent
o American descent
o Australian descent
o Canadian descent
o European Union descent
o Hispanic or Latino descent
o India national descent
o Middle Eastern descent
o Russian descent
o Other
3 – Gender
Please specify your gender.
o Male
o Female
4 – Infrastructure Sector Affiliation
Please indicate the infrastructure sector you are most closely aligned with.
o Chemical Sector
o Commercial Facilities Sector
o Communications Sector
o Critical Manufacturing Sector
o Dams Sector

154
o Defense Industrial Base Sector
o Education Sector
o Emergency Services Sector
o Energy Sector
o Financial Services Sector
o Food and Agriculture Sector
o Government Facilities Sector
o Healthcare and Public Health Sector
o Information Technology Sector
o Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector
o Transportation Systems Sector
o Water and Wastewater Systems Sector
o Not affiliated with any of the infrastructures provided above
5 – Technical Hacking Ability
Please indicate whether you have hacking technical skills or no technical hacking skills.
o Hacking skills (hacking ability towards any type of technological hacking,
including ethical hackers, penetrations testers, red team/blue team hackers, bug
bounty hackers, recreational hackers, education sanctioned hacking, and those
affiliated with white hat, gray hat, and black hat hacking, to name a few)
o No technical hacking skills
6 – Education
Please indicate the last education level you completed.
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o No schooling or some schooling without a diploma
o High school graduate or equivalent
o Trade/technical training or a college degree
o Master’s degree or higher
7 – Employment Sector
Please specify the employment sector you are most closely aligned with.
o Private sector
o Public sector
o Non-Governmental Organization
o Retired
o Unable to work
Using the Likert and Semantic Differential Scales below choose the given options that
best align with your position for the research questions.
8 - On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your
1 – Strongly agree
2 – Somewhat agree
3 - Neither agree nor disagree
4 – Disagree
5 – Strongly disagree
9 - On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate your attitude towards the
need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law?
1 – Strongly agree
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2 – Somewhat agree
3 - Neither agree nor disagree
4 – Disagree
5 – Strongly disagree
10 - On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate your inclination on the
extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it would be implemented
globally? See the United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) penalties chart
below, serving as an example for the question.
1 – No penalties
2 – Minimal to less than moderate penalties
3 – Moderate penalties - neither the least of penalties nor the harshest of penalties
4 – More than moderate penalties
5 – Harshest of penalties
Summary of the United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) Penalties
Offense Section in CFAA Sentence*
Obtaining National Security Information (a)(1) 10 (20) years
Accessing a Computer and Obtaining Information (a)(2) 1 or 5 (10)
Trespassing in a Government Computer (a)(3) 1 (10)
Accessing a Computer to Defraud & Obtain Value (a)(4) 5 (10)
Intentionally Damaging by Knowing Transmission (a)(5)(A) 1 or 10 (20)
Recklessly Damaging by Intentional Access (a)(5)(B) 1 or 5 (20)
Negligently Causing Damage & Loss by Intentional Access (a)(5)(C) 1 (10)
Trafficking in Passwords (a)(6) 1 (10)
Extortion Involving Computers (a)(7) 5 (10)
* The maximum prison sentences for second convictions are noted in parentheses.
Source: Prosecuting Computer Crimes Manual, p. 3, CCIPS Division of the DOJ

